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Volume I Number 2 
The Lawyers and the Courts 
if we practice law today we must practice i t  a s  i t  is-as it is  now 
enforced. We must learn and unlearri and lay aside pre-conceived 
opinions that are no longer tenable just a s  we throw aside our old 
clothes when they are  no longer of service. If we would succeed we 
must keep in touch with the new developments, the change of statutes, 
the decisions of the higher courts, and the application of principled. 
The lawyer may feel that some of these are  wrong but what difference 
to him? The rule is against him in the present case but i t  may be 
to his interest to invoke i t  in his favor in the next. 
There is a small class of lawyers that  always grumble and com- 
plain. A case is lost and the result is charged to the Court; upon 
~t is laic!. ignorance, bias and prejudice. Courts some times rule 
wrong but a lawyer has his remedy; he can have the case reviewed. 
Lnnrycrs hxve often just complaints against judges but complaint. 
personal animosity and want of charitable consideration of the work 
of a Judge are the strongest evidence of the small caliber of the law- 
. A lawyer like a prize fighter should train himself to take and 
receive punishment; but like the prize fighter he should by his a r t  
ward off as much of this as  possible. There is no more disgusting 
cshibition than a lawyer going to a judge and complaining of per- 
sonal treatment. 
Judgc xnit Law:-PI. each know or ought to know their place and 
relations; ihe Ian. outlines and fixes these. The lawyer acting proper- 
ly in his ldncc, with proper respect for  the  Court should be independ- 
ent, know his rights 2nd maintain them; i t  should always be a pleas- 
ure o i  :: .'ild!;e Lo be courteous, fa i r  and considerate. A lawyer 
should never be a coward and ask for  quarter, but this does not mean 
that a Court should temporize with self-serving exhibitions. The 
author once heard an antideluvian practioner when he was shown a 
decision of the Supreme Court in point against the contention of his 
argument meet i t  with the reply: "Well, they are  the only three 
men that ever had any such ideas." The trouble with some grumb- 
lers is that they do not know what their clients are  entitled to nor 
when they get what is coming to them. Grumblers as  a rule stand 
on archaic platitudes and misapprehension of the Law. 
The judiciary of Georgia is  elected by the people. There has 
becn much said for and against this mode of selecting judges. There is 
no way of selecting the judges but which is open to  criticism and ob- 
jections. One thicg must be conceded; the present pian has yivezi 
the State a good judiciary; our present judges will compare favor- 
ably w ~ t h  those a t  any tlme iil our history. The objection urged 
mainiy is that i t  puts the judges in politics; that  the best lawyers arc 
not selected. The f i rs t  question here is  what is politics? If by i t  
i s  melint popular appreciation, a warm heart and hearty handshake; 
an  ability to  appreciate and feel the needs and necessities of the peo- 
ple-the grind of poverty and the struggies of the poor-and an  
earnest endeavor to administer the law to humans in a humanely 
way-then the more politics the better. If by politics is meant 
only political advancement for the candidate; the getting of the of- 
fice by every a r t  known to dirty politics; the avowal of some special 
interest to be favored in order to get votes; a regard for  religioil 
that the candidate never exhibited until he entered the campaign, 
then the less of such the better. We have had candidates for the of- 
. 
fice of judge who were cold and phlegmatic by nature, but learned 
in the law; who lived within themselves in the world but not of i t ;  
who prided themselves on their professional ability and studied only 
law and not the people; with no close friends, selfish and calculating 
and whose make up would not respond to  an electric current and 
when they offered themselves as candidates with a royal pose such 
men were not elected. The English judiciary from the earliest timev 
v;as filled from the standpoint of politics. John Marshal, Chief 
Justice of the United States, appointed by John Adams, was schooled 
as a politician; the present Chief Justice, a great man, was Presi- 
dent of the United States, was defeated for re-election and after- 
wards appointed to his high office; Chief Justice Taft  is a great 
ex'ample of an  able, high toned, outstanding patriotic American but 
these grumblers would call him a politician. Consider other ap- 
pointments to that high Court; Chief Justice Taney served an  ap- 
prenticeship under Andrew Jackson a s  a politician. 
The writer does not know any ideal plan to select the Judiciary: 
he was elected a Superior Court judge three times by Legislature 
without opposition and twice by the people with opposition and quit 
of his own motion. Judges are  now elected by the people and i t  
would be better fo r  the grumblers to go to the polls and make their 
ideas concrete rather than to attack the present system. 
A court is made up of i ts officers, judge, attorneys, clerks, 
sheriff and jurors. In the proper disposition of business each of 
these must function properly. There is little complaint of the fail- 
ure of the clerks and sheriffs; as  a rule they are  good officers and 
discharge their duties. Comparatively few verdicts are  set aside a s  
improper verdicts. While sitting in the Supreme Court, I wrote in  
the case of Allison v. Richmond Railroad Co., 89 Ga. Page 572: 
"Whoever has had any experience with juries must concede , 
that  they endeavor to do right. They take questions of fact in a 
practical way, unimpeded by the legal fetters that  restrain a pro- 
fessional mind. They may not find sometimes as  a court would 
find. The reply is, the law has left this work to them. If they do 
their work fairly under the rules, courts ought not to disturb their 
verdicts. In "Trial by Jury," by Forsyth, he says: "It was said 
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or socrates that he first  drew philosophy from the clouds, and made 
i t  walk upon the earth. And of the civil jury i t  may be also said 
that i t  i s  an institution which draws down the knowledge of the laws 
to the level of popular comprehension." From this standpoint, ifi 
a practical way, by practical men, verdicts are  made. 
Juries are  changing bodies and not often do the same jurors sit  
in different cases. The work of juries is characterized by an  obli- 
gation to duty and an  endeavor to find proper verdicts. The greater 
number of cases are  reversed on the charges and rulings of the 
judges and for these in most instances the lawyers are  responsible. 
Lawyers are  loyal to their clients and often on doubtful questions 
their contentions are  not sustained. The Higher Courts must lay 
down general rules applicable to the instant cases which makes a pre- 
cedent to he afterwards fol!owed. It would be unfortunate if this 
were otherwise for then there would be no certainty in the subse- 
quent trial of cases. 
There are  lawyers and lawyers. They have been the butt of 
many a story. Dickens tells us of Sergeant Buzfuz who gained his 
case over his opponent by open hypocrisy and diaphanous pretensions 
which have long since been overworked and placed in the discard. 
Buzfuz won a verdict in a case that was fabricated from star t  to fin- 
ish. The legal profession in current literature is lambasted by hal1- 
baked writers about fictitious cases drawn from their imaginations 
a s  to  all the proceedings; their helpless dummies do their alloted 
parts and their manikins perform to order and complete satisfaction. 
The writers manufacture their stuff to sell-it has to be something 
out of the usual-something that in the minds of the publishers will 
attract and pander to a certain morbid stratum of the public eager 
for  something to sustain their preconceived opinions. Lawyers let 
such stuff pass; their shoulders are  broad and they can bear it. Let 
one of these critics get his shins skinned or toes mashed by a rail- 
road or if he sees a long shot to get some money out of the estate 
of a distant relative he hunts up a lawyer. While the writer was 
upon the Superior Court bench he overheard a certain self esteemed 
Socrates discoursing against electing a lawyer to the legislature. 
He prided himself on being an  American citizen, that he had no use 
for  courts nor lawyers; that  he never had a lawsuit but attended to  
his own business; that  courts and lawyers were a useless burden upon 
the people. A few weeks later he came with a lawyer to my office 
ahunger and athirst for  an injunction. It seems he had found him- 
self in another latitude. The writer knows of no business nor pro- 
fession where every one following i t  is a saint and f i t  to be trana- 
Inted; a t  least this could not be insisted on for  the lawyers. Law- 
yers could be divided into three classes: There Ts the older and more 
experienced class that  have been longest a t  the bar. The men that  
started with them-those that  be!onged to the third stratum-the 
guerilla class-have lonx s ix" .  been eliminated and weeded out. This 
o!der class has been trie.'; ou t ;  i t  !?as a1u~a.v~ nractfced law as  a pro- 
fession; i t  has regarded its traditions and ci!!ir.s. They have the 
confidence of the public and are  ful! of bu!:iness. No c!ass o r  pro- 
fession can claim a. greater percentzige of honorable, patriotic men: 
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they have the confidence of everybody and do the greater part  of the 
important work of the courts. There is another stratum that is 
separate from the third class and will not mix with it. These a re  
the young men that  have entered the profession to  practice law and 
observe the ethics that  obtain among all true lawyers. They have 
studied hard in their preparation; they work, are  courteous and have 
an ambition to fully and fairly discharge their duties to the court 
and their obligation to their clients. They leave their clients satis- 
fied and are  respected by their fellow members. These young fellows 
are  the coming men; honorab!e and high toned, they condemn a man 
that  would act otherwise. The third class base their claims upon the 
fact that they have been admitted to the Ear  and have licenses to 
practice. Measuring them by their knowledge of the law and there 
work there is  presented an inscrutable proposition as  to how they 
ever achieved any such result. They do not know what their clients 
a re  entitled to nor when they have gotten what is  coming to them. 
They glory in being distinguished by the appointment of the judge 
to defend some colored brother that  has been caught in another's 
hen roost or has slaughtered a hog that did not be!ong to him. This 
class i s  strong on oratory-of the loud, rancous and strident kind 
that  makes the welkin ring. It matters not what the evidence is  
one of these stresses the presumption of innocence-the reasonable 
doubt-but greatest of all the  defendant's statement. When the jury 
brings in a verdict of guilty he is  satisfied fully that  he has made a 
great effort but cannot understand and is a t  loss as  to why the jury 
could find against his speech. Some of this class will tell anybody 
with any kind of a case that they can gain i t ;  that  there is no trouble 
about it. They infest the jails; they chase ambulances; they solicit 
cases. Such men are not lawyers; they are  guerillas; they live off 
of the ignorant and have lofty ideas RS to  fees-they grab every- 
thing in their reach. 
We have a world of law books; the publishers continuously grind 
them out;  new editions; new text books with a rehash of old princi- 
ples. The State Reports and Federal Reports contain little beyond 
the application of old r@es. We have new laws that must be con- 
strued. The courts and the legal profession a r e  charged with a lack 
of progress. Our attention is called to the industrial world with its 
standardized mass production; to the invention of the radio, the de- 
velopmept of electricity, the automobile, the great strides in transpor-- 
tation and to the advancements made in the a r t  of killing people in 
war. We are  asked why the enforcement of the law does not keep 
step with all this progress? The answer is we have the laws and 
they a re  easily applied if the courts could get t,he facts before them. 
We must go to the scene of the murder to get the witnesses; to the 
place of the hold up which was planned by shrewd men as  to time 
and place to prevent identification and rely on evidence unforseen by 
them to convict them. Much of the evidence in such cases must 
come from their companions in crime who do not hesitate a t  perjury. 
In  such cases we cannot choose our witnesses. Good citizens have 
no part  in the commission of crime; they cannot 5e witnesses because 
they are not there. We must ordinarily get the witnesses from the 
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criminal class and depend on them for the evidence upon which to t ry 
the criminals. In the Courts perjury runs riot. There are few in- 
dictments for perjury; i t  is present almost every day in all the 
courts. Some witnesses who think they are honest fall f a r  short 
when their evidence is properly weighed. Some psychologists insist 
that there is no one who has no prejudice or bias. I will not discusa 
this; there is too much to be said. I am reminded of a story: A 
good church member-a pillar of the community and who was point- 
ed out to the young as  an examplar of everything that an  upright 
man should be was put upon his voir dire as  a juror in a murder 
case. He answered all the questions to qualify him. He was asked 
if he had any conscientious scruples against capital punishment. He 
answered: "Not in this case." The rich and the poor, vice and vir- 
tue, good men and bad men go upon the witness stand. From much 
lying, perjury, in conflict with honest evidence courts must endeavor 
to discover the truth. The Lord failed to  get the truth from Adam 
and Eve in the garden of Eden. Human nature has always been th5 
same. The human heart is desperately wicked and deceitful above 
all things. If the courts are to make progress they must have the 
facts to which to apply the law. This must come from a regenera- 
tion of the human; he must be brought to a realization of his obliga- 
tions and responsibilities. As to how i t  is to he done the writer does 
not know. In the middle ages torture was used. Psychiatrists have 
lately lent a hand but have not succeeded. 
The Bar owes courtesy to the Judge. This should be reciprocal. 
The lawyer is bound to give i t  to the Judge, not so much to the man 
that holds the office. Lawyers are ready to credit the Judge with all 
the good that is in him. This does not mean the adulation of the 
sycophant on the part of the lawyer nor the hollow meaningless com- 
pliments on the part of the Judge. Courtesy is as  cheap and easy as  
the breathing of the air. It should betray no effort and be as a 
matter of course. A Judge should expect it  and never be driven to 
demand it  from the men who appear before him. The inherent pow- 
er of a court over the Bar should sleep like the lightning and strike 
only to hurt. Like the electric chair, i t  should be kept out of sight 
and used only when needed. A Judge should not talk too much. The 
stories of his forensic triumphs, the history of his legal conquests, 
the annals of his family, though they may be cherished memories 
with him, do not interest the public. It may endure them, but i t  
does not follow that they are appreciated. 
Men have come and gone; i t  is useless for a man to  make him- 
self out a prodigy. No Judge should glory in the idea of trying to 
present himself as a terror; his breathings and threatenings should 
be left off. Such things are not necessary to the assertion of his 
office. It has been said that we know nothing of a man until we 
give him power; but no Judge should offer himself as  an illustration 
of this saying. Every Judqe ought to be a Christian, but i t  is dan- 
gerous for him to  claim too much religion. 
A Judge of the Superior Court has more power as such Judge 
than any other officer of the State. This power affects the rights 
and liberties of the people; the laws that protect these are adminis- 
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tered by him. To properly discharge the function of this high of- 
fice, it is not only necessary that a Judge should endeavcr to do 
right, but also that he should bring to the discharge of his duties a 
knowledge of the law and understanding of the construction of the 
laws as passed upon by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court, along with these great qualities of head and heart. 
He offers himself as such officer upon the undertaking to exe- 
cute the laws as they are written, and to exercise the judicial func- 
tion as delegated to him by the people. 
A Judge is in the limelight; his reasons are weighed; his mo- 
tives are considered. He is given the discretion in many matters, 
and this should never be looked upon by him as simply the power 
to carry out without restraint his preconceived ideas. The people of 
the circuit and the lawyers that represent them have a right to as- 
sume that such discretion will be exercised in a legitimate way and 
within the limits conferred by law. He should not regard the mat- 
ter of discretion as  arbritary and a carte blanche unlimited and un- 
restrained. The discretion should never be exercised under the 
same circumstances one way a t  one time and a different way a t  an- 
other time; i t  should be based upon some rule of reason that can be 
understood by the bar and the people. A Judge should never throw 
away his discretion. I t  is given to the Judge and not to the man; 
i t  is not given to be controlled and exercised, by prejudices or indi- 
vidual ideas. If such be true, the exercise of discretion would be 
given to the man. The greatest tyrant in the world is the one that 
writes his laws so high that they cannot be read or  when the law is 
enforced from a standpoint of caprice that cannot be anticipated. 
To undertake to define egoism from either a metaphysical or 
ethical standpoint would lead one far  a field. The phase of i t  dis- 
cussed here makes such a consideration unnecessary. I t  has been 
defined in philosophy as "A term applied to any view that was sup- 
posed to make the individual self the only reality knowable." As 
considered here, it  is applicable in a few inst~nces to that character- 
istic development of a few judges and lawyers that labor under the 
delusion that i t  is necessary to put themselves too much in evidence 
on any and all occasions. < 
Few judges are afflicted with it, some lawyers suffer from it, 
and the public helplessly endure it. In a Judge, its existence is man- 
ifested by much talk; by a continual assertion of his power and au- 
thority as if his commission were contested; by finding fault unnec- 
essarily; by criticising the work and pleadings of lawyers and en- 
deavoring to leave a presumptive inference of their sloth and 
ignorance.' The use of lung power a t  a high pressure is one of it3 
symptoms. 
An acute attack sometimes deprives a Judge of all ideas of cour- 
tesy, or at least he shows none, and displays displeasures a t  every- 
body and everything. There is but one effectual remedy for a Judg,? 
that has a chronic case of egoism and that is to apply the proper 
treatment a t  the polls. It i s  unfortunate for a lawyer to suffer 
from egoism. I t  might be defined when applied to him as  a con- 
tinual assertion of the possession of extraordinary ability and know- 
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ledge where i t  is not conceded; he deals in trite fundamentals and 
broad platitudes as  controlling and which are handed out in a patron- 
izing way as only the odds and ends of his common stock; these by 
ponderous assertion he insists are applicable in every proposition 
presented; opposing counsel to his mind can do nothing right; with a 
rotund voice he wears a pleasing smile and beams upon every one 
who does things to suit him; he divides humanity into two classes, 
fools and rascals. The fools are those that oppose him and do not 
agree with him; the rascals are those that do not assent to anything 
and everything that he wants; he has a liberal supply of adjectives. 
In his opinion, shadowed forth by his activities, he is a great man 
and a wonder. Suppose for a moment that we should have a Judge 
on the Bench laboring under egoism and a Bar, each member of 
which was down with the disease, just think of such a spectacle. 
Everybody knowing everything-no one knowing anything,--every- 
body talking, nobody listening; i t  would be a panegyric to call such 
a Court a pandemonium. 
A lawyer with an incipient case of egoism is usually benefitted, 
if not entirely cured, by the atmosphere of a Bar that properly apprc- 
ciates such claims and performances. Occasionally i t  happens that 
by a happy prod from opposing counsel through the armor joints of 
his self importance he is brought to a realization of the fact that 
lawyers are practical and take such pretensions a t  their true worth. 
Whilst egoism is prevalent, i t  is by no mertns epidemic and some- 
times one case has the happy effect of leading all others to take pro- 
per precautions to ward off the disease. 
One of the greatest obstacles to the dispatch of business and the 
enforcement of the law is the flood of eloquence that overwhelms the 
courts. I t  knows no bounds and has no limits. I t  makes no differ- 
ence as to the character of the case or the amount of evidence; i t  is 
part of the regular bill of fare and must be endured. Under the 
rules the judge is helpless whether i t  is logical or illogical. Much 
of it is f a r  fetched inferences drawn from the imagination. The evi- 
dence shows one case and quite another is argued; in fact the idea in 
some places is abroad that the determination of issues of fact depends 
entirely on the concluding speech, often made up of garbled evidence 
and reckless assertion. Those who indulge this way ought to have a 
regeneration and become imbued with the spirit of the law and the 
relation that an Attorney bears to the court. Much of this could be 
controlled if the judge would enjorce the rules; the opposing col.in~el 
dare not object before a judge who is lax in their enforcement. The 
object of all legal investigation is the discovery of the t ruth;  in some 
places this is disregarded and instead the object is to gain cases, by 
any means fair  or foul. 
Code Section 4965 provides :- 
It is the duty of attorneys a t  law-To employ, for the purpose of 
maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are 
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges or 
juries by any artifice or false statement of the law. 
To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no 
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a pady or a witness, 
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unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are  charged. 
These duties set out in the Code seems to have been forgotten by 
some lawyers; a t  least they are disregarded. 
Again Code Sections 6261 and 6262 are as  follows:- 
Arguments of counsel shall be confined to  the law and the facts 
involved in the case then before the court, on pain of being considered 
in  contempt; and in all civil cases questions of law shall be argued 
exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury. Code 
Sec. 6261. 
No attorney shall be permitted to interrupt another, while ad- 
dressing the court or jury, except to correct him in a misstatement 
of evidence, or  misrepresentation of the position of counsel, upon 
pain of being considered in contempt; and such interruption, when 
made, shall always be addressed to the court, and never under any cir- 
cumstances to the counsel. Code Sec. 6262. 
The following is part  of an  opinion written by Chief Justice 
Richard B. Russell, now of the Supreme Court of Georgia, who wrote 
i t  in the case of Pelham & Havana R. Co. v. Elliott, 11 App. 630. At 
that time Judge Russell was one of the Judges of the Court of Ap- 
peals. This opinion presents the subject of argument in a pointed 
and incisive way and presents the matter clearly. 
"The rule is, that it is contrary to law for counsel to comment upon facts 
not proven. He represents his client-he is the substitute of his client; what- 
ever the client may do fn the conduct of his cause; therefore, his counsel may 
do. I n  relation to his liberty of speech, the largest and most liberal freedom 
is allowed, and the law protects him in it. The right of discussing the merits 
of his cause, Both a s  to the law and the facts, is indispensable to every party; 
the same r i ~ h t  appertains to his counsel. The range of discussion is wide- 
very wide. He is entitled to be heard in argument upon every question of law 
that may arise in the cause; in his addresses to the jury i t  is his right to des- 
cant upon the facts proven or admitted in the pleadings; to arraign the con- 
duct of parties, impugn, excuse, justify, or condemn motives, so far as they 
are developed in evidence: assail the credibi1i.t~ of witnesses, when that  is im- 
~ e a c h e d  ,by direct evidence, or by the inconsistency or incoherence of his testi- 
mony, his manner of testifying, his appearance, or  by circumstances. His il- 
lustrations may be a s  various ai are the resources of his genius; his argumen- 
tation as full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if he will, 
give ply to his wit, or wIng to his imagination. To his freedom of speech, how- 
ever, there are some limitations. . . . It has been found difficult to prescribe 
a legal limitation to the lawyer's liherty of speech in the performance of hls 
duties in a cause. Tha.t the discussions should be free is perfectly obvious; 
and even abuses should be tolerated, rather than a privilege so valuable should 
be abridged. We fell the delicacy of the ground upon which we tread, and are 
solicitous of being understood as carrying our present ruling no farther than to 
cover the precise question made in the assignment. . . . Statements of facts 
not proven, and comments thereon, are outside of a cause; they stand legally 
;?-relevant to the matter in question, and are  therefore not pertinent. If not 
pertinent, they a re  not within the privilege of counsel. . . . Trial by jury! 
How imperfect a privilege would that be, if the forms of law were abandoned 
-if the rules of evidence were disregarded! An essential element in the trial 
by jury i s  that their verdict shall be rendered according to the f x t s  of the 
case, legally produced to them. They are sworn to give their verdicts accord- 
ing to evidence, and if they find without evidence, or against evidence, a new 
trial will <be granted. They cannot even render a verdict upon knowledge with- 
in thecr own breasts; but if a juryman has knowledge of facts pertinent to the 
issue, he may be sworn. The law, with great carefulness, prescribes rules by 
which facts are to be submitted to the jury. Testimony must be relevant- 
the best evidence the nature of the case admits must be produced; hearsay Is 
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excluded; interest in the witness will disqualify, etc.; and .by our own consti- 
tution ,in criminal cases the witnesses are to ;be confronted with the prisoner. 
He has in all cases the right of cross-examination. All these and many more 
rules are prescribed for the ascertainment aT the truth of those facts upon 
which verdicts are to be rendered. The law to be administered may depend 
upon the facts proven. Ex  facto oritur jus. 'And if the fact,' writes Black- 
stone, 'is perverted or misrepresented, the law which arises from thence will 
unavo*bly be unjust or partial; and in order to prevent this, it is necessary 
to set right the fact, and establish the truth contended for, *by appealing t o  
some mode of probation or trial, which the law of the country has ordained 
for a criterion of truth and falsehood.' 3 Black Com. 330. When counnel 
are permitted to state facts in argument and to comment upon them, the usage 
of the courts regulating trials is departed from, the laws of evidence are vio- 
laed, and the Pull benefit of trial by jury is therefore denied. I t  may be said 
in answer to these views, that the statements of counsel a re  not evidence; that 
the court is bound so to instruct the jury, and that they are sworn to render 
a verdict only according to the evidence. Whilst alJ this L true, yet the d- 
feet is to bring the statements of counsel to bear upon the verdict with more 
 or less force, according to c:rcumstances; and if they in any degree influence 
the finding, the law is violated, and the purity and impartiality of the trial 
are tarnished and weakened. If not evidence, then without doubt the jury 
have nothing to do with them, and the lawyer no right to make them. And 
just here the argument might be rested. It is not reasonable to believe that 
the jury will disregard them. They may struggle to disregard them; they may 
think that  they do disregard them, and still be led involuntarily to shape their 
verdict under their influence. That influence will be greater or less, accord- 
ing to the character of counsel, his skill and adroitness in argument, and the 
natumlness with which the statements stand connected with other facts and 
circumstances in the case. To a n  extent not definable, yet to a dangerous ex- 
tent, they are evidence, not given under oath-without cross-examination, and 
irrespective of all those precautionary rules by which competency is tested. 
"In this case the statement and comments had reference to the character 
and credibility of the witness. I know of no rule of law which authorizes the 
credibility of a witness to ,be impeached or fortified thus. The manner of at-  
tacking or  defending the character of a witness is fixed by law; and fixed, 
among other things, that he may not be subject to  irregular and irrensponsible 
assaults upon his veracity and fairness. He. as well as parties and counsel, 
has rights, which it is the duty of the court to protect. I t  were a cruel injus. 
tice to permit his character to be driven to and fro like the shuttlecock, by 
outside statements of counael. Where shall the license stop? If allowed 
against the credibility of a wXness, then with equal reason they are to be al. 
lowed a s  touching the merits of theissue. If crimination is granted, recrimi- 
nation cannot be refused. If statements on one side a re  permitted, counter- 
statements on the other cannot be denied. If allowed to me of the highest 
honor, they cannot be clenied to those few to be found in all professions. desti- 
tute of all honorable principle. The concession, carried out in its legitimate 
consequences, mould convert the stern, inflexible law and order of a court of 
justice, into confus?on, uncertainty and Injustice." 
In the 10 Ga. 410 the Supreme Court said:- 
It is not necessary to speak of the rights and obligations of counsel, so 
far as concerns their relation to theid clients; except to say, that it is unques- 
tionably the right and duty of counsel to bring to the view of the Court. for 
'ts determination, any point of law, which properly springs out of the cause, 
and which they may think important for the interest of their clients. Thcy 
are in Court for that purpose; they are ;bound to observe closely, to labor dili- 
gently and to know thoroughly, in order that they may secure the determina- 
tion of the rights of their client, according to law. The 6eautilful theory of a 
trial is this: Both sides a r e  represented by counsel, that  their rights may be 
settled, not by a r t  or chicane, or the tricks of the orator, but according to the 
law. I t  is therefore, the duty of counsel t o  present to the Court the points 
which he conceives are in favor of his client; and it is his right to be heard in 
argument to sustain them: and when presented, it  is the duty of the Court 
to pass upon them, if they grow out of the case, but not otherwise: and of that  
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he is to judge. I f  he declines t o  pa= upon a principle thus moved, and it 
springs out of the case, such declining is error, and if an appellate tribunal 
finds .t in favor of the party moving it, a new trial will be awarded. A s  offi- 
cers of the Court, the duties of counsel are not in conflict with those which 
devolve upon him as the representative of a party. They a r e  the friends of 
the Court, enlisted with him in the sublime work of discovering truth, and 
dea1:ng out justice between man and man. I t  is not the duty of counsel to 
suggest points of law which are against his client; ,but it is his duty to insist 
upon no point which he knows Yo be contrary to law. Whilst judgment be- 
longs alone to the Judge--enlightenment is the province of the lawyer, and I 
apprehend that no Judge can be found so presumptuously vain, or so flagrant- 
ly unjust, as not to recognize, and that too with grateful emotions, the aid 
which he derives, in the discharge of duties more solemn than belongs to any 
other functionary, from an able bar. 
From 10 Ga. 521p:- 
I would be the last man living to seek to abridge freedom of speech, and 
no one witnesses v i th  more unfeigned pride and pleasure than myself, the 
effusions of forensic eloquence, daily exhibited in our Courts of Justice. For 
the display of intellectual power, our bar speeches are equalled ,by few, sur- 
passed by none. Why, then, resort to such a suberfuge? Does not history, 
ancient and modern-nature, art, science and philosophy-the moral, po1:tical. 
financial, commercial and legal-all open to counsel, their rich and inexhnust. 
ible treasures, for illustration? 
Here, under the fullest inspiration of excited genius, they may give vent 
to their glowing conceptions, in thoughts that breathe and words that burn. 
Nay more, giving reins to their imagination, they may permit the sp:rit of 
their heated enthusiasm to swing and sweep beyond the flaming ,bounds of 
space and time-extra flammantia moenia mundi. But let nothing tempt them 
to pervert the testimony, or surreptitiously array before the Jury, facts which, 
whether true or not, have not been proven. 
We have from 27 Ga. 210:- 
We do not know that more need be said, as to the proper conduct of coun- 
sel in arguing causes. We find it difficult to confine them to the record in 
this Court, and it is more Cifficult we doubt, to in the Court below. For there, 
i t  is not always agreed as to what has or has not been proven; there may be 
a n  honest mistake as to that, while here i t  is a matter of record, about which 
there need be no misapprehension. To depart from the testimony, much more, 
voluntarily to  pervert or misrepresent or add to it, is a great wrong; and to say 
nothing worse, it leads to those unseemly altercations which so seriously dis- 
turb the decorum and dignity of Courts. For myself, I envy not the success 
of those who achieve their triumphs in this way. I intend this as  a general 
remark. and not for the counsel in this case. 
There obtains a divergence of ideas in the argument of cases. 
The difference is  especially noticeable in comparing the practice in 
one circuit with that  of another. Often one would imagine tha t  all 
rules had been abrogated or  that  he  had gotten in a foreign jurisdic- 
tion. Some time ago the writer-found himself in a Superior Court 
where the case of the State vs. Sam Hill charged with chicken steal- 
ing was on trial. Col. Josiah Singer represented the defendant. 
Col. Josiah Singer boasted that he never looked inside of a col- 
lege; that  he was a self made man; that  he and the Lord alone were 
responsible for  the making; and that in so as he was concerned he 
was satisfied with the job. The speech was so unique; i ts  piercing 
periods made a lasting impression on my memory. I found myself 
taking notes; that  night I filled them out as  best I could and next 
day I submitted them to the Colonel. With a few amendations he 
approved them. I am not willing that  this piece of eloquence should 
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be lost to posterity and for  this reason I have inserted i t  as  illustrat- 
ing one school of oratory in the court room. I pride myself on the 
fact that I have been able to save this classic from oblivion. While 
Col. Josiah Stringer has not been consulted as  to this publication I 
feel sure from his good nature, and love of notoriety he will not ob- 
ject as  the annals of the courts would be incomplete without it. The 
Col. considers this one of his greatest efforts. More than this Col. 
Josiah Stringer now has his eyes turned heavenward, gazing a t  the 
stars and reading from them a great political future. I t  is to be 
regretted that the future career of this great patriot is to depend 
upon the uncertain shuffle of the cards in the political game. He 
has the best wishes of many admiring friends who hope that luck and 
Providence will be kind to him. 
Col. Singer sat  in his office. He was through with his work 
for the day. He threw his feet upon his desk and meditated. Many 
things presented themselves for consideration and first of all his 
exchequer was low and had to be replenished. He concluded, after 
much thought, he had not been assertive and did not put himself suf- 
ficiently in evidence. He knew he had great ability and circumstances 
had been such that he had not been able to show it. He concluded 
that i t  had been his fault and with a fixed determination to place 
himself a t  the head of the Bar in Center City he arose, closed the 
door and betook himself to his lodgings. 
Bright and early the next morning Col. Josiah Singer went down 
to the jail to see the Sheriff. The Col. used few words but these 
were to the point and there was an agreement by which the sheriff 
was to have the inmates of the jail to employ the Col. and in return 
the Col. was to give the Sheriff one-half of his fees. The compact 
having been made the Sheriff carried Col. Josiah Singer to the cell 
door of Sam Hill a colored citizen who was awaiting a trial for chick- 
en stealing. There was a proper introduction and the Sheriff told 
what a great lawyer Col. Josiah Singer was and what he could do. 
Sam a t  once relieved the situation by offering Col. Josiah ten dollars 
of the first money he got after he "put him on the ground." The 
Col. was inquisitive and asked Sam how much cash he had and what 
he could pay down. Sam in a mournful voice prompted doubtless by 
the complex of his indigence and condition told the Col. that he did 
not have a nickel-not even a cent. The Col. had a big heart-and 
an abundance of human sympathy and he told Sam that he would 
accept the employment, that his oath of office required him never t9 
reject for a consideration personal to himself the cause of the dc- 
fenseless and oppressed. Sam said he was certainly "pressed" and 
was glad de Lord had sent him a friend. Mr. Jones 'cuses' me of 
takin his chickens-just two little pullets and an old rooster and 
I'll tell you Kurnel fore God if I was a t  de roost dat night I was sure 
walkin in my sleep. 
Now Sam stick to the truth as  you have told me and I will sure 
put you on the ground, said Col. Josiah Singer in a tone of assurance. 
Court came. The Sheriff brought in Sam Hill: The Judge 
called the case before Sam was seated. No answer: the Judge asked 
Sam if he was the defendant. Sam replied-Nor Sir, Judge 1's not 
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the fendant; 1's de gentlemen what stole de chicken. Col. Josiah wae 
attracted and coming to the front informed the court that the defend- 
ant was ignorant and what he meant was that he was accused of 
stealing the chickens. 
The jury was stricken and the Solicitor General introduced hie 
evidence. On the night in question Mr. Wade Smith swore he had 
the toothache; was awake about one o'clock and heard a dog bark and 
a chicken squall. He got his flashlight went to the hen roost where 
he flashed his light and found the defendant Sam Hill with two pul- 
lets in one hand and a rooster in the other; ready to travel. Had 
Sam put chickens back on the roost; carried Sam down to jail. 
Col. Josiah Singer now embraced his opportunity to give the wit- 
ness a thorough cross-examination, and to sift  the witness: 
How many chickens did you have? I had up to a few weeks ago 
forty-seven but Sam Hill or  some one else has stolen them all but 
the three Sam had. 
Do you know Sam got the other chickens? 
All I know I ran a nigger off from the hen roost about three 
weeks before this with a bag and from his build and size as  he rav 
under the electric light in my opinion i t  was Sam; I found next morn- 
ing four chickens missing. HOG old were your chickens? 
I would say the pullets were about four months old and i t  was an 
old rooster. 
Are you sure i t  was the defendant the night you swear he had 
the three chickens? 
Sure I do; I have known him a long while. 
Tell the jury how you have come to know him. 
I was on a jury in this court last year that convicted him of 
stealing a hog from Jim Rhodes. 
I s  i t  not a fact that if you saw the defendant that night he waa 
walking in his sleep, when you caught him and carried him down to 
jail? 
Sam was wide awake as he is now and talked to me as I carried 
him to jail. 
What did he say to you as a part of the res gestae? 
He told me in the hen house that he hoped I would "Scuse" him 
as the preacher was a t  his house and he wanted the chickens for  his 
breakfast. 
Sam made his statement. He said if he was a t  dat hen roost 
dat night i t  was sure while he was walking in his sleep and he never 
woke up until he was in  jail. 
Col. Josiah Singer not having introduced evidence was entitled to 
the conclusion. The Solicitor made a short statement and stopped. 
He told the jury they were intelligent men and he would leave the 
case with them. Col. Josiah arose with a majestic air ;  his dress 
was perfectly appropriate. He wore a long black coat that he but- 
toned up and adjusted his red cravat. He felt his responsibility. 
His a r t  was all his own. He began in dulcet tones; soon i t  was a 
crescendo attended with physical manifestations. He said :- 
Gentlemen of the jury. It is with trepidation on account of the 
great responsibility that  I come before you to argue in behalf of 
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the liberty of this American citizen who a t  this time on account of 
this malicious prosecution is now in durance vile. My appearance 
here is  in response to a call of duty to which the good Lord helping 
me I will always respond. 
I meet you as  a jury in this case whom the jury commissioner,s 
of this county have selected as upright and intelligent men. From 
your attention and alertness they have made no mistake. The Lord 
always writes the good heart and intelligence of a man on his face. 
You bear his handwriting; he has stamped i t  on your brows. I have 
practiced law in many States; I have appeared before many juries in 
my extended practice and I never stood before a jury with greater 
confidence than now. I am fully persuaded that you will do you1 
duty though the heavens fall, and remove from his character thesc 
aspersions that this American citizen stole two little pullets and a11 
ancient rooster. 
The Superior Court is a great court; i t  has general jurisdiction; 
i t  has great powers; you men pay taxes to support i t  for its legiti- 
mate purposes-to t ry murder cases-rape cases-hold-up cases, 
burglaries and like cases. Has i t  come to pass in Center City, the 
home of wealth and intelligence, of churches and schools, of happy 
homes and great industrial enterprises that your Solicitor General 
would degrade its powers and take the time and attention of this 
court a t  a cost of one hundred dollars a day and clog the wheels or 
justice with such a case as this; to prosecute an American citizen on 
perjured evidence for stealing two little pullets and an ancient roost- 
e r ;  to jeopardize the liberty of an American citizen with such a case 
is a damnable, diabolical shame. I have read all of the U. S. Reports, 
your State Reports and I defy the Solicitor General to show me a 
case where any Solicitor General heretofore has brought an indict- 
ment against an American Citizen for stealing two little pullets 
and an ancient rooster. 
I have told you of my readings and of my efforts to know the law. 
I found a case decided by John Marshal, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. He was the boss of the law and he de- 
cided: "De minimis lex non curat." As some of you may not be 
Latin scholars, as  I am, I will translate i t  for you-"The law does 
not bother about trifles." If John Marshal were here, and I am sorry 
he is not, he would tell this prosecutor, this Solicitor General, "to heil 
with your case about two little pullets and an ancient rooster." They 
would hide their faces and slink out of this Court House in disgract! 
and shame. Yes, if Old John Marshal was here today he would drive 
them out of this temple of Justice just like Jesus Christ drove the 
money changers out of the temple a t  Jerusalem. 
The Solicitor General made no speech. He did not dare to at- 
tempt to argue the case. He just told you that you were intelligent 
men and he would leave the case with you. Gentlemen think of such 
a speech. He told you that you were intelligent men. You knew 
that;  everybody within the sound of my voice knew i t ;  the judge on 
the bench knew i t  and the Solicitor General is trying to raise an issue 
as to your intelligence. Gentlemen of the jury I measure my words 
and Col. Josiah Singer is responsible here or anywhere else for what 
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he says. I say here and now that a more attrocious insult was never 
flung in the face of a jury; these are my sentiments. 
Again he says that he will leave the case with you. This is a 
wonderful statement. He seems to have been hesitating whether he 
would toat i t  off or leave you the bag to hold. I do not blame him for 
leaving i t  with you; he wanted to get rid of it. He wanted to make 
you responsible for his prostitution of the law in this case where he 
has brought a free, liberty loving, American Citizen before this great 
court on the flimsy charge of stealing two pullets and an ancient 
rooster. He leaves i t  with you, of course he does and is glad to wash 
his dirty hands of such a case. 
The Legislature in its wisdom passed an act which provides that 
every American Citizen upon the trial of a criminal case has a right 
to make to the court and jury such statement as he deems proper in 
his own defense not under oath and to which the jury can give such 
force as they deem proper and the jury can believe i t  in preference 
to the sworn testimony of the States witnesses. 
Gentlemen this is the Magna Charta of liberty; i t  was made for 
just such a case as  this. I t  says the jury can believe i t  in prefer- 
ence to the testimony of the States wi tnesseeany number of State's 
witnesses. Here there is only one State's witness. Yes you can 
believe i t  in preference. The idea of liberty is the foundation of our 
laws; the pearl of great price. You are given the liberty to believe 
i t  and liberty that carries with i t  the burden of responsibility. It 
is  your duty to believe i t  over the evidence of the trumped up yarn 
of this perjured prosecutor, which sounds like the midnight ravinga 
of some distempered hash-eater suffering with pains in his stomach. 
Of course you will believe i t  and turn this American Citizen loose. 
In this case there was a special interposition of Providence. The 
Lord took care of this defendant. He was walking in his sleep. He 
told you, this in his statement. This prosecutor did not dare to go 
back on the stand and deny it. 
The Lord looked after him. Down a t  the end of the street that 
passes the house of this prosecutor is the river swift and deep. If 
this defendant was in that chicken house that night somnambulisitn, 
and walking in his sleep he was there by a special interposition of 
Providence for the Lord directed him there. If this had not happen- 
ed he would have walked on down that street and tumbled in tha 
river and been drowned. I repeat again that this American citizen 
ought to thank the Lord for this special Providence and protection. 
This perjured prosecutor says he found him in the chicken house. I 
ask did he hurt the chicken house; he didn't tear down any door b i  
bbreak any window; he didn't steal any chickens because he says he 
made him hang them back upon the roost. There never was a mora 
malicious, damnable, diabolic persecution instituted against ah Amer- 
ican citizen and all for two little pullets and one ancient rooster. God 
save the mark.. Gentlemen of the jury there is a time when duty 
calls; when i t  will not down. YOU may squelch and resist i t  but your 
consciences will upbraid you and you will be indicted on that great 
day of judgment when the ruler of Heaven and earth presides on the 
great white throne. 
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In the World War 2,000,000 of our young men went across to 
f a r  off France a t  the call of duty to fight for liberty and to make 
the world safe for democracy. Our great grey war ships loaded down 
with men and cannon scoured the seas a t  the call of duty to help in 
the battle for liberty. Julius Caeser marched to the Rubicon and 
those Roman Morons dared him to cross but in the face of duty he 
jumped in with his clothes on. At the battle of Trafalgar Nelson 
commanded the English fleet against that of the French. Nelson 
hung a t  his masthead the signal, "England expects every man to do 
his duty." The sailors were inspired; for duty they fought like 
tigers and wiped the French fleet off the ocean. 
Now George Washington was not a saint; when i t  was neces- 
sary he would cuss a little. When he started to fight the battle and 
capture the Hessians a t  Trenton, as history tells us, he came to the 
Delaware River which was full of ice and i t  was a cold and snow,. 
night. Some of his generals thought the night too bad and did not 
come. Some of his staff advised him to give i t  up as the weather 
and ice were too rough. George gave the order: "Get across," 
damn the weather and the ice." They went and gained the battle of 
Trenton. He acted from a sense of duty. When George cut his 
father's cherry tree he owned i t  to his face from a sense of duty. 
Many a father would have spanked him but from a sense of duty he 
didn't. Speaking to a jury as intelligent men as you are, I have no 
idea I am telling you what you do not know, but I am simply call in^ 
your attention to these examples of duty we get from history. As 
you know, history teaches by example. , 
Now, Gentlemen of the Jury, from all these examples I ask you, 
I beseech you, to do your duty. Give this American citizen a safe de. 
liverance from this infamous and malicious charge of stealing these 
pullets and an anchient rooster by returning a verdict of not guilty. 
While Col. Josiah Singer was delivering this great speech he 
intoned and controlled his voice in a most remarkable way. At one 
time he used i t  like the plaint of a song bird bereaved of her lost 
mate. . Again i t  was raucous and strident as if he defied everything 
and everybody; then i t  reached the sublime like the rolling thunder; 
i t  was a great effort. 
At this point Col. Josiah Singer stopped and seemed to pull him- 
self together. He straightened himself up; made sure his coat was 
buttoned and adjusted his red cravat. You could have heard a pin 
drop in the court room, i t  was a tense moment; there was an air  if 
expectancy. I t  foreboded something was coming. Then Col. Josiah 
Sanger began :- 
Rome rose on the ruins of Greece to waive her scepter over the 
subjected world. The mighty Hannibal raised his arm against her 
and she crushed it. The captured flags of the conquered nations 
waived from her walls as emblems of her asserted power. I t  was 
then that Virgil strung his lyre to sing of the fame of Aenaes; Cice- 
ro shook the forum with the thunders of his elo~uence and struck 
terror into the hearts of the tyrants. Caesaer then livcd and 
At this juncture the judge who for some time had been sitting 
uneasily called out and said :- Col. Josiah Stringer your time is up: 
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when and whereupon the Col. turning to the court said:- I am not 
half through. The judge remarked again-Your time is up. Col. 
Josiah Singer sat  down and after having run his fingers through his 
long black hair he mopped his face. 
His collar was wilted by perspiration from his physical eloquence 
and he took a pose of supreme satisfaction while the judge charged 
the jury. They retired and after time to write the verdict they 
came into court with a verdict of guilty. At once the Judge told 
Sam Hill to  stand up. Col. Josiah Singer stood up also and addres- 
sing the court said he hoped the court would be light on the defend- 
an t ;  that he had been convicted of stealing two pullets and an ancient 
'ooster and besides, said Col. Josiah Singer, he is a poor man. He 
paid me one hundred dollars in cash for defending him as  this was 
all he had. I would have charged him more if he had it. You know 
your Honor under my oath of office I cannot refuse a case of the 
poor for  any consideration personal to  myself. 
The judge promptly sentenced Sam to  twelve months in the chain 
gang. When this fact became a mental concept with Sam he turned 
to Col. Josiah Singer and blurted out:  "God e r  mighty Kernel you 
said you would put me on de ground." Col. Josiah became heated 
his face blushed and he replied: You rascal you do not appreciate 
what I have done for you. I have by my professional ability put you 
on the ground; you have the privilege of digging and shoveling dirt  
on the roads for the next twelve months. If i t  had not been for me 
you would have been hanged. ' 
One embryo pettifogger congratu!ated Col. Josiah Singer on his 
speech as being wonderful. Col. Josiah Singer said himself that i t  
was a great speech but he did not see how in the world that  jury ever 
ran over i t  and found the defendant guilty. He seemed mortified a t  
the disrespect shown him in not taking longer time to consider the 
verdict. 
It may be urged that such a trial is exceptional and that  such an 
exhibition does not often happen. This is conceded but there are 
parts of i t  that  appear in many cases. Note the cross-examination 
which was in disregard of all rules and without any object or purpose; 
i ts  only effect was to make sure the case of the prosecution. He 
ignored the evidence; he vituperated the witness without any reason: 
his assurance and self-exploitation availed nothing; the chances are  
that he will stay in his ru t  and' learn nothing from experience. The 
lawyer must be practical; he must practise law inside of the law and 
i ts  rules. If Col. Josiah had been practical he would have filed a 
plea of guilty for his client and bade him good bye for the chain gang. 
M. Boucher, a French writer, wrote:- 
"A Lawyer ought to present himself with an honest assurance 
and plead with firmness, but with modesty in his language and de- 
meanor. He should avoid affectation or fetching things too f a r  
and should not wander from his subject. It he demands a favorable 
hearing, let him do i t  with dignity and not in any rampant tone. He 
ought neither to exhaust himself too much or humble himself too 
much, and the less he can manage to talk about himself the better." 
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The Development of Trial by Jury 
A distinguished bacteriologist when asked for  a brief account of 
the first appearance of harmful germs in the human system, remarked 
simply : "Adam had 'em." 
Unfortunately the origin of the jury cannot so briefly be told. 
Nor, popular opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, is  this mode 
of trial of great antiquity. I t  is true that all of the civilized races 
of the earth have a t  certain stages of their development evolved a 
method of deciding controversies somewhat related to it. I refer to 
those ancient tribunals which were composed of all the free men of a 
community--or certain selected freemen-such as the body that  tried 
and condemned Socrates, or the old popular courts of the Teutons and 
Scandanavians. But they were not juries, they were courts. 
"If we are  seeking for  a court," say Pollock and Maitland in their 
work on Early English Law, "In which a t  the bidding of i ts presi- 
dent, or some national or royal officer, earldorman or reeve, the 
inhabitants of a district, o r  some group . . . . deemed the dooms, 
shall pronounce judgment, we shall have no difficulty in discovering 
the origin of trial by jury. Everywhere we might find such courts, 
for during the earlier middle ages i t  is the exception rather than 
the rule that  the judgment be made by the lord or  president of the 
court, or by a group of professional justices. But what the jurors 
or recognitors of our Twelfth Century deliver is no judgment; they 
come to recognize, to disclose the t ru th ;  their duty is not iudicin 
facere, but recognoscere veritam." And they reach the conclusion, 
now generally accepted by antiquaries, that the system was derived 
from the Norman inquest. 
It must be borne in mind that  the jury as  established in England 
and as  still maintained there and in the British commonwealths, is  
not a court, but simply an adjunct of a court. I t  is a group of lay- 
ment unskilled in the !aw and sworn to declare, not what is just, not 
what is equitable, but simply what is the truth-the t rue facts in the 
case. They have nothing to do with the effect of their findings. 
They are  not concerned with the judgment to be pronounced. They 
are merely the means whereby the judges are  furnished the facts 
upon which to  predicate the judgments. 
I emphasize this simple historic province of the jury because 
many Americans assume that the numerous functions now performed 
by juries in this country (such, for  example, 2s determining punish- 
ment in felony cases and rendering general verdicts in intricate 
equity causes) have either always been exercised by juries or consti- 
tute merely the restoration of pristine prerogatives. Confusion may 
be avoided by keeping in mind that  the American tendency to make 
of the jury something in the nature of the grimitive community 
tribunal is entirely unwarranted by English precedent. 
When trial by jury was established in England i t  was under 
Norman rule, the old "popular" courts had long been discarded and 
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the prevailing mode of trial was by compurgation, ordeal, combat and 
decree of the king's justiciars. 
The conquerors had brought with them to England an institution 
known as  the inquest or recognition which was employed first  by 
William in compiling Doomsdng Book. I ts  procednre mas to call to- 
gether the leading men of a community who Itnew the facts and have 
them to answer under oath such questions as might be asked then  
concerning the ownership or value of lands for  taxes, or other mat- 
ters in which the ruler had an bterest .  It had long been used by the 
Frankish kings in Gaul to settle controversies over royal properties, 
and was in vogue when Normandy was first  invaded. When we first  
find record of i t  in France i t  seems to have been conducted in an  in- 
formal way between the king's representatives and the people of the 
community. Later, only the most prominent and upright men of the 
district were summoned. They were witnesses a s  well as  jurors and 
no man who professed ignorance of the matter was allowed to serve. 
The number, naturally, was of wide variation. There are records of 
. 66, 53, 41, 20, 17, 7, etc., having been employed. Presumably all 
the "good men" who knew the facts were used. 
Historians are not agreed as to the origin of the inquest nor from 
whom the Franks acquired it. Some maintain that i t  was brought 
from Asia by returning crusaders; others that i t  came to France 
from Germany where i t  had been borrowed by the Angles and Saxons 
from their Slavonic neighbors in Northern Europe; still others de- 
clare i t  was of Scandanavian origin. Stubbs in his Const?:tutiomL 
History of England, says, "it may have been adopted (by the Franks) 
from the fiscal regulations of the Theodosian Code and thus own some 
distant relationship with Roman jurisprudence." 
At  any rate we can say ~yi_th historic certitude that i t  was used 
by the Frankish kings in the ninth century. "We see it," say Pollock 
and Maitland, "in the Neustria which the Normans are invading. 
Then the darkness settles down. When i t  lifts we see in the new 
states that have formed themselves no central power capable of wield- 
ing the old prerogatives. For a long time to come the sworn inquest 
of neighbors will not be an utterly unknown thing in France, i t  will 
only be overwhelmed by the spread of the romno-canonical proce- 
dure; even in Germany i t  will appear from bime to time; yet on the 
whole we may say that  but for the conquest of England i t  would have 
perished and long ago become a matter for  the antiquary." 
The prevailing opinion is that i t  was unknown to Anglo-Saxon 
England although there is a law of Ethelred the Unready, of about 
the year 997, which cannot be entirely rejected as evidence of its 
use in Danish England before the Conqueror arrived. It must be 
remembered however, that this law refers to the accusing jury, not 
to the trial jury. It provides that a moot must be held in every 
Wapentake,  and the twelve eldest thanes are  to KO out with the reeve 
and to swear upon the relic which he puts into their hands that they 
will accuse no innocent and conceal no guilty man. I t  is argued by 
some scholars that a form of accusing inquest which was used by 
Frankish churchmen to collect charges of sin as their royal contempo- 
raries used i t  to  collect charges of crime, may have been borrowed by 
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English churchmen, and the plan in  tu rn  again appropriated, in  Eng- 
land, by the temporal power. But of this no direct evidence has been 
found. Certainly it cannot be said that  the Danes or  other Scanda- 
navian peoples did not themselves evolve a system very similar to the 
inquest, although on this too the evidence is lacking, due largely to 
the comparatively modern date of their books. But however that  
may be, and whether o r  not the Danes brought such a system to Eng- 
land there is no indication that  the inquest was used anywhere in  
England as  a mode of trial, nor indeed that i t  was used a s  an  accus- 
ing jury outside of Danish territory, or, in short, that i t  became an  
English institution until William the Conqueror brought i t  with him 
as his ducal prerogative. I t  has been suggested that  the readiness 
with which the English fell into its use in the compiling of Doomsday 
Book is an evidence of their familiarity with it. And there are  cer- 
tain Scandanavian scholars who still maintain that  jury trials were 
had in England long before the Conqueror arrived. Most English- 
men, however, a re  agreed that what was used in early England was 
the community court in which the doomsmen not only determined 
guilt but pronounced the judgment. 
Aside from employing the inquest in fiscal matters, the indica- 
tions are  that  very little use was made of i t  during the first  century 
of Norman rule. There has been preserved, however, a record of a 
trial in which the Conquerer directed his jz~sticiars to summon the 
moots of several shires to one place there to hear a plea between the 
Abbot of Ely and divers other persons, and certain men of the neigh- 
borhood were required to declare upon oath what lands were held by 
the church of Ely on the day of the Confessor's death. But such in- 
stances were few and in each case the parties were merely permitted 
(for a substantial fee to the crown) to exercise this royal privilege. 
I t  was not until well into the reign of Henry I1 towards the end of 
the twelfth century that litigants were given the right to demand a 
trial by inquest, and then only in actions for  land. 
And these ordinances of the second Henry, usually referred to as  
the Assizes of Clarendon, undoubtedly mark the beginning of the Eng- 
lish jury system. First  there was granted in 1166, the action known 
as  the assize of novc:l disseisin, over which Bracton tells us were spent 
many wakeful nights. It provided that if any person be dispossessed 
of his free tenement unjustly and without judgment he is  to have the 
right tc, demand a trial by inquest. At about this time there was 
also instituted the Grand Assize and the petty assizes. These assizes 
were merely the prescribing of definite rules of procedure for  empan- 
elling inquests, or (as they were later called) juries. As we have 
seen, in the early days the number of recognitors-or jurors-was 
not certain. Now i t  was rather definitely fixed a t  twelve, although 
for several centuries afterwards we know that  variations from this 
number were permitted. 
The manner of assembling the Grand As.sixe is thus described in 
an early report: "Four knights were called who came to the bar 
girt  with swords and were charged to choose twelve knights g i r t  with 
swords from themselves and others," and these armed knights thus 
selected from among those who were assumed to know the facts, were 
sworn to answer truly the questions propounded to them. If the 
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twelve could not agree this fact was made known to the court and 
new knights were added until there were secured twelve who could 
agree. In the p e t t y  assizes twelve jurors were selected by the sheriff, 
who were not required to be knights. I n  certain of the important 
actions the right was given litigants to be tried by the Grand Assize, 
in others the p e t t y  assizes were used. 
At this time the knowledge upon which jurors acted was their 
own, and long after the practice was established in later years of 
permitting witnesses to testify before the jury they had the right to 
disregard such testimony entirely and rely upon their own knowledge 
of the facts. But modern investigators also believe that  even from 
the first  the recognitors were not restricted to their own personal 
knowledge. I t  was not necessary that  they be eye-witnesses; when 
they were summoned they were told of the nature of the controversy 
and were expected to fully inform themselves concerning it. 
As the number of jurors were at first  not invariably fixed at  
twelve, so too was the rule requiring unanimity unknown. Brunner 
says that only in the second half of the fourteenth century did this 
principle become established. (And even today in England the par- 
ties may and frequently do agree to a majority verdict in civil cases.) 
But after the rule became fixed the judges used the harshest meas- 
ures to  bring about an agreement. In 1334 i t  is recorded that  "be- 
cause one jury man had delayed his companions a day and a night 
without agreeing with them, and this without reason, it was awarded 
that he stay in the Fleet." 
Jurors were not allowed food or drink, water excepted, nor heat 
while they deliberated. And if they continued deadlocked to the end 
of the term of court, they were carted, in the wake of the judges, to 
the edge of the county and there dumped into a ditch. 
Why the number twelve was hit  upon is thus explained by a 
writer in 1665: 
"This number is no less esteemed by our law than by Holy Writ. If the 
twelve apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal state, good 
reason hath the law to appoint the number of twelve to try our temporal. 
The tribes of Israel were twelve, and Solomon's officers were twelve. There- 
fore not only matters of fact mere tried by twelve, but of ancient times twelve 
judges were to try matters in law in the Exechequer Chamber, and there wers 
twelve counsellors of state for matters of state; and he that wageth his law 
must have eleven others with hlm who believe he says true. And the law 
is so precise in the number of twelve that if the trial be by more or less, it is 
a mistrial." 
From the beginning with novel disseisin the number of causes 
that the parties were permitted to t ry by inquest rapidly increased 
until before the end of the next century we find (in the three years 
1256, 1269 and 1279) that out of a list of 103 civil cases all but two 
were disposed of by this method, and when the ordeal was abolished 
in 1219, the inquest was used in criminal cases. 
When, however, we recall the modes of trial the inquest supplant- 
ed, i t  is easy to believe the remark of Bracton that  the decision to 
grant i t  occasioned many wakeful nights, and ( i t  may be added) 
sleepless knights. Probably a typical indication of how the new mode 
of trial was received is given by a writer of the 13th century who 
complains in the Mimow that  i t  is an abuse that one should not be 
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allowed to t ry  his case by battle or ordeal but must submit to  what a 
set of strangers might say, mere witnesses selected by a public of- 
ficer. .It will be recalled that  a t  that  time the belief was almost 
universal that justice was divine, and that  the ordeal and battle 
were but human agencies through which the will of God might be 
made manifest. 
Of course no criminal caught red-handed was given a trial of 
any sort. When a felony was committed the law required that there 
be raised a t  once the hue and cry. If one chanced upon a dead body, 
for instance, and failed to raise the hue, besides putting himself 
under the gravest suspicion he was liable to be amerced. The proper 
thing for  him to  do was to cry "Out, out," whereupon all within hear- 
ing were required to turn out with their bows, arrows and knives, 
and with much clamor and blowing of horns the hue was carried 
from vill to vill. If the culprit was taken and had still about him 
signs of the crime he was given short shrift,. If he resisted he was 
slain. If he submitted to capture his doom was already sealed. He 
was immediately taken to court and without being permitted to say 
a word for himself was promptly beheaded or thrown over a cliff, 
the person aggrieved most probaby acting as  executioner. Nor were 
such summary methods confined to crimes of violence or theft. If a 
litigant in a civil suit produced a forged writ he was as  promptly 
hanged unless he could name a warrantor. 
But i t  was one thing to dispatch a culprit known to be guilty or 
shown to be so by unmistakable signs from Heaven, while quite an- 
other to dispose of him merely upon the verdict of human beings. 
Anc! the judges found much difficulty, after the abolition of the or- 
deal, in adjusting the new mode of trial to criminal cases. In the 
Leges  Henric i  the author flatly declares, "No one is  to  be convicted 
of a capital crime by testimony." In  1219 when the f i rs t  eyre of 
Henry I11 was in progress instructions were sent to the judges from 
the Kings Council to the effect that  persons charged with the gravest 
crimes were to be kept in prison for safe custody, but the imprison- 
ment must not endanger life or health. If the crimes were less 
serious and the accused under the old law would have gone to the 
ordeal they might be allowed to abjure the realm. If the crimes 
were light they might give pledges to keep the peace. Nothing is  
said about compelling any of them to submit to a trial by inquest. 
Somethins was required to meet the situation and the .judges finally 
hit upon this way out of the difficulty: while they believed that  no 
man should be tried by jury without his consent they had no scruples 
in forcing that consent, and the felons were subjected to the severest 
hardships. They were "ironed," they were forced to lie on the 
ground in the foulest spots in the prison and allowed only a little 
bread one day and a little water the next. And soon the horrible 
practice of peine f o r t e  e t  dure  was developed, which consisted in plac-. 
ing upon a prisoner more iron than he could bear. 
Thus was consent obtained and trial by jury incorporated into 
the body of English criminal law. 
. The change from the old inquest of recognitors in full posses- 
sion of the facts to a jury without knowledge of the matter was very 
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gradual; a t  first only witnesses to deeds were allowed to appear o 
attest the authenticity of these documents, but with the increased 
use of the system, witnesses were relied upon more and more. In 
the reign of Henry IV we find the judges declaring that the jurors 
after they have been sworn must not be permitted to see or take with 
them into the jury room any evidence other than that offered in the 
coui-t, although the personal knowledge of the jury was not then 
considered as outside of the evidence, and stress was still laid upon 
securing jurors only from the neighborhood. At length, however, 
we find the judges ruling that if a man has any knowledge of the 
cause, especially if he has formed a decided opinion, he cannot quali- 
fy as a juror. 
Space will not permit any lengthy discussion of the grand jury. 
It has already been remarked that in the time of Ethelred the Unready 
in that part of England which had been conquered by the Danes, such 
a system was used. But there is no record of its having been used 
elsewhere in England prior to 1166 when Henry the second issued his 
famous assizes of Clarendon. I t  is therefore not too much to say 
that the Grand Assize, which was employed as an accusing jury as 
well as a trial jury, was the beginning of the grand jury system in 
England. 
In course of time it came to be recognized that the accusing jury 
should not serve as a trial jury, and the two were made separate 
and distinct, and from the more or less perfunctory agency of help- 
ing men to the gallows in the early days we find that trial jurors 
during the 14th century had developed such leniency that many of 
the judges felt constrained to use coercive means to induce them to 
convict. But that phase too, passed, and i t  was recognized that 
jurors should not be coerced in any way. 
I cannot, for want of space, detail the further development in 
England of this system which has been so woven into the web and 
woof of the English constitution as  to be not the least of its disting- 
uishing characteristics. Suffice i t  to say that except for having been 
made liable to punishment for making unwarranted verdicts and later 
having such liability removed, the modern jury there is almost identi- 
cal with those last described. In civil causes only such questions of 
disputed fact are submitted to the jury as the judge certifies to be 
material. Many causes are disposed of without the aid of juries. 
Nor will space permit more than a brief reference to some of the 
pronounced American modifications of the system, which were largely 
wrought during the past hundred years. 
Many of the States have declared by statute that in criminal 
trials the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts, although 
jurors are not allowed to carry law books with them into the jury 
room; and in some of the States jurors are required to fix the pun- 
ishment of felons whose criminal record they are not permitted to 
learn. Judges have been forbidden in most of the States to express 
or intimate any opinion as  to the weight of the evidence or  the cred- 
ibility of witnesses. The practice of rendering general verdicts in 
civil causes of every nature, which enables the jury to apply their own 
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construction of the law of the case, prevails in practically all of the 
State courts in the Union. 
I t  is difficult to say whether or not this trend in America to- 
wards vesting in the jury the powers and duties of the old tribal courts 
has reached its limit. Chief Justice Taft and many other distinguish- 
ed jurists advocate confining the province of the jury to its original 
function of finding the facts. This view, added to a growing feeling 
that all is not well with the machinery of administering justice in 
America, coupled with the frequent comparisons (to our disadvant- 
age) of courts in this country with those of England, may bring about 
a reaction. But that of course concerns the future, which is  beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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Appellate Court Briefs and Arguments 
Address Delivered before the Georgia Bar Association. 1927. 
There has been great change in the method of presenting cases 
to appellate courts since the organization of the Supreme Court of this 
State. No time limit of argument was fixed by the original rules 
of that court; reading of authorities to the court, which now is dis- 
couraged, was formerly required; and i t  was provided that "no 
cause shall be urged by brief alone." In a decision rendered in 1852 
(Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 489) Judge Lumpkin said: "We have 
listened patiently a t  least, if not with unmixed pleasure, to eight elab- 
orate arguments, occupying more than as many days." He added 
that these arguments (which were by the most eminent lawyers in 
the State) were "on questions some of which have never been dis- 
puted, and most of them heretofore solemnly adjudicated in this 
court." After a case in the United States Supreme Court had been 
argued for eight days, Judge Story wrote that probably i t  would oc- 
cupy five more; one lawyer spoke three days. We are told that Chief 
Justice Marshall "encouraged extended arguments, often demanded 
them." (Beveridge's Marshall, vol. 4, p. 96.) What was said by 
Judge Lumpkin in the fifty-page opinion mentioned, a s  to long argu- 
ments, may in part explain why he said, in a year in which only 138 
cases were decided by his court, that there was imposed on that 
court "an amount of labor . . . . without a parallel in any other 
appellate tribunal in the world." 
Eventually brevity in argument became necessary, to enable the 
court to decide all the cases in the time prescribed by the constitu- 
tion; and the entire time for argument on one side was limited, first 
to two hours, and later to one hour. A half hour is the limit in the 
Court of Appeals in civil cases involving not more than $1000 and 
misdemeanor cases. In some States a half-hour rule applies to all 
cases; but (as in this State) more time may be granted on request 
made before argument. 
In a large proportion of the cases in the appellate courts of this 
State there is no oral argument. Lawyers often remark that i t  ia 
not worth while to make such an argument; that the briefs suffice; 
but a fact that they may overlook is that an oral argument reaches 
judges who without i t  would know nothing of the case except from 
the statement of the judge who writes the decision; for i t  is not 
practicable for all the judges to read the record and the briefs in all 
the cases in which they join in the decision. The value of an oral 
argument depends much on the time that passes before the judges 
consider the case, but even when there has been long delay before 
consideration, a judge is likely to recall a t  least the impression made 
on his mind a t  the time of argument; and if that impression does not 
accord with the view of the judge who has prepared an opinion for 
the court, i t  may cause further consideration of the case. In many 
cases a conclusion as to how the case should be decided is reached by 
judges a t  the time of the oral argument. If counsel on one side 
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argues the case orally, i t  is to the interest of his adversary to have 
an opportunity to reply and to make corrections. A great jurist 
(Judge Dillon) said: "As a means of enabling the court to under- 
stand the exact case, . . there is no substitute for oral argument." 
But an oral argument is of little or no value if i t  is not clear or 
does not leave a distinct impression on the minds of the judges. If 
a lawyer thinks i t  worth while to go to the appellate court for argu- 
ment, he should consider i t  worth while to give careful thought to 
what he shall say. Men often travel a long distance and waste time 
and expense to make an argument from which the hearer learns little 
of the case, or of which, to repeat a common remark, i t  is impossible 
to make head or tail. Many waste time in details which the judges, 
with minds crowded with other cases, can not be expected to remem- 
ber, or in discussing the weight or credibility of testimony which, 
when the jury and the trial judge have accepted i t  a s  true, the ap- 
pellate court must treat as  true. 
Much that may properly be included in a written argument 
should be omitted from oral argument. Reading a t  length to the 
court from the record or from anything else is discouraged. "The 
true function" of oral argument, said the head of a court which had 
adopted the half-hour limit, is that of "briefly introducing the case 
to the court and affording the judges who are to decide i t  an oppor- 
tunity to make inquiry of counsel, and the latter to enlighten the 
court, on points that may suggest themselves in course of presenta- 
tion." Most cases, however, can be thoroughly argued in the time 
allowed by the rules in this State. 
There is no rule in this State as  to what a brief shall contain. 
Formerly a rule of the Supreme Court required that briefs "be con- 
fined to a statement of the points insisted upon, and a citation of 
authorities;" and i t  was added that "if counsel desire to furnish a 
written summary or narrative of the facts, or to make a written ar- 
gument, this must be done in a separate document, and not by ex- 
panding or overloading the brief." A good practice is to include 
these features under one cover, beginning with the short brief, and 
following i t  with a development of the case and presenting the argu- 
ment in the order in which the points are stated in the preliminary 
brief. Points omitted will not be considered. 
The rule of the United States Supreme Court as  to briefs is  long 
and need not be stated here; its first requirement is that the brief 
shall contain "a concise abstract, or statement of the case, presenting 
succinctly the questions involved and the manner in which they are 
raised." A simple and helpful requirement is that the brief shall 
refer to pages of the record. An index in front is useful when a 
brief is long. Grounds of a motion for a new trial are often dealt 
with in a decision in the order in which they appear in the motion; 
and this method is used in most briefs. This is convenient, but is 
not always the best method. Grounds which can be discussed to- 
gether may be grouped in ' the  brief. Short headings indicating tho 
matter of the grounds, or of other points discussed, are helpful. 
Good examples of briefs are to be found in the United States Supreme 
Court Reports and in the earliest reports of our State Supreme Court. 
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In this State the reporter now is not allowed to give more of the 
briefs than their points and citations. 
Often from one page to three or four pages suffice for brief and 
argument; and where no greater space is used the method of arrange- 
ment is not important. If the record is short, nothing is gained by 
repeating much of i t  in the brief. If there is much amendment of 
pleadings, the court may be aided by showing briefly the effect of 
the amendments. The brief may aid the court in elimination. The 
elimination should extend to trivial and hopeless exceptions. 
Cases differ so widely that there is no system suited to all briefs. 
They may well vary in arrangement, just as judicial opinions do. 
System is useful only as a means to an end. When you have in 
hand the material for your brief, the first question to consider is, 
how can you most quickly and clearly put your case into the mindn 
of the judges. 
I offer a few short practical suggestions in the form of a dozen 
points or paragraphe : 
Brevity is the first rule of briefing; clearness the cardinal 
virtue of a brief. 
Begin by mentally putting yourself in the place of the 
judge; t ry to find the shortest road to the mind uninformed 
as to your case. 
A judge wishes to know first the question he is to decide. 
Give i t ;  show how i t  arose. 
Give as briefly as  possible the facts the judge needs to 
know. Do not require him to charge his mind with useless 
things to get a t  your case. If there is no good reason for giv- 
ing names, places, dates, figures, or other details, omit them. 
Ficts usually should be stated in order of time, or grouped 
to support points. Often they may be stated in such a way 
as in effect to argue the case. 
Come promptly to the strongest points, just as you would 
in trying to sell to a busy man. Attention to an oral argu- 
ment usually is best a t  the beginning; weak points may 
weaken it. Don't waste time on "pointees." 
Citations not in point are worse than useless; they cause 
waste of the court's time, and may cause distrust of your 
judgment or of your fairness. Examine each case cited. 
Long quotations are to be avoided; short ones are often a 
good way of both stating a point and supporting it. 
Assume that the judges know the A-B-Cs of the law, and 
that argument is not needed to convince them on well- 
settled points. 
Avoid jury arguments to a court that can not consider 
them. 
Personalities forbidden by the rules get you nowhere but 
in contempt of court. 
"Honesty is the best policy;" i t  ia a great mistake to lone 
the confidence of the court by unfairness or misleading 
statements. Don't go outside the record. 
Important is the statement of a former Justice of the Supreme 
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Court of the United States, Judge Clarke, in addressing the New 
York Bar Association, that "there can be no doubt whatever that 
many a meri tor ius case has been lost in an over expanded statement 
of evidence or in the wilderness of inappropriate citations in which 
it has been submerged beyond the hope of resurrection in a treatise 
styled a brief." If briefs were responsible for wrong decisions by 
the great court of which Judge Clarke was a member, what are we 
to expect from courts in general when similar briefs are presented to 
them? And how important i t  is to know what to omit from a brief. 
Frequently, in the Supreme Court of the United States, judges 
interrupt argument by saying, "State your question." A rule of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that briefs shall begin with a state- 
ment of the questions involved, says, that the rule "is designed to 
enable the court to obtain an immediate view of the controversy. I t  
must state the question or questions in the briefest and most general 
terms, without names, dates, amounts, or particulars of any kind 
whatsoever. I t  should not ordinarily exceed fifteen lines, and must 
not under any circumstances exceed a page." Nothing else is allowed 
on that page. "For any violation of this rule . . . . the appeal 
(will be) non-prossed. This rule is to be regarded as  in the highest 
degree mandatory and admitting of no exception." The penalty 
stated, the court has said, may be inflicted "even in murder cases." 
This rule and a half-hour limit for argument on each side "ma- 
terially aided one of our busiest appellate tribunals in bringing its 
work up to date," said Chief Justice von Moschzisker. He added: 
"When the rule is efficiently followed, as i t  is in the great majority 
of cases, the court can, a t  a glance, perceive, a t  least in a general 
way, the points for determination, and, with this accomplished, tho 
judicial mind can better concentrate on the argument." "Often ap- 
pellant's statement is so satisfactory that the court, in writing its 
opinion, takes up the questions involved just as they are stated and 
follows that order throughout." (34 Yale Law Journal, 287.) Inci- 
dentally i t  may be said that sometimes briefs have been adopted by 
judges as opinions. Sometimes a judge's way of making a case clear 
in an opinion is a good model for a brief. 
Much space in briefs can be saved by omitting what may be im- 
plied. For example, your case would not be on the docket if certairi 
preliminary steps had not been taken; why detail them a t  length? If 
a brief insists on a ground of a motion for a new trial, the court 
need not be told first  that such a motion was filed, "and duly came 
on to be heard," that "the court, after hearing the same, passed an 
order overruling said motion," and that "movant thereupon filed in 
due time his bill of exceptions to this court, assigning error on said 
judgment," etc. You can leave some things to the record. 
Verbosity tempts to skimming. Nothing is gained by using 
long and stilted forms of expression instead of the simple language. 
of ordinary speech and of the best writers. Why, for instance, should 
the ten words, "prior to the time of the filing of the action," be 
preferred to the two words, "before suit?" 
I t  is not my purpose to depart so f a r  from more practical mat- 
ters as to dwell upon niceties of expression. Though, as was said by 
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Judge Bleckley, "in school the composition would not pass, . . i t  
may be tolerated in the co-urt-house." That great lawyer, Sir Fred- 
erick Pollock, chief editor of the English law reports, however, in an 
address to the American Bar Association (1903), thought i t  worth 
while to condemn, as  a "pest of the law reports," so small a thing 
as  what he termed "the slovenly misuse of 'such' as  a demonstrative," 
a use peculiar to lawyers. 
Reading is not made easier by saids, sames, and certain other 
legal-document words. Writers of law-books and of judicial opinions 
make their meaning clear without a superfluity of such expressions, 
and the framers of the Federal constitution avoided them. 
Form, of course, is secondary to substance, but i t  is  important 
so f a r  as i t  is an aid to substance; and great judges have taken great 
pains to be not only correct, but clear and concise, in their opinions. 
Judge Bleckley, who could be luminous, said: "I reconsider, revise, 
scrutinize, revise the scrutiny, and scrutinize the revision." 
I do not go so f a r  as  one writer does who lays down the rule, 
"Never dictate a brief;" but as to dictated briefs I suggest, as a 
general rule, revise; or brief the brief. 
Don't annoy the court with excessive noise. Habits formed in 
addressing juries cling to many lawyers in the appellate courts, and 
some not only use jury arguments, but shout their cases a t  the court. 
I t  may be that such seeming earnestness accounts for the statement 
that "it was earnestly contended," found in judicial opinions, but 
this statement is made only where the argument failed to convince. 
I have dealt only with the manner of presenting a case. Before 
briefing, of course, there should be thorough knowledge of the facts 
of the case and careful search and examination of the law and decis- 
ions that may be applicable. 
After so much has been said about brevity, I must not myself 
ignore, further than I have already done, the advice given on that 
subject. 
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Liens and Assignments of Bankrupt 
Exemption Property Under Georgia 
Practice and Decisions 
The right to sell or otherwise dispose of property claimed by a 
bankrupt as  exemption is settled in Georgia by a number of direct 
rulings on the point. ( 1 )  
I t  is equally as  well settled that a note containing a clause that 
assigned the exemption property to the holder of a note and directed 
the trustee to deliver over to the holder a sufficient amount of prop- 
erty or money claimed as exempt to pay the note, although executed 
prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, had the legal effect 
of a valid assignment of the bankrupt's exemption after i t  was set 
apart to him and being older than an exemption assignment made by 
him after his adjudication, was entitled to priority of payment over 
the junior one. (2) 
The principle ruled in cases in which i t  was held that an insolvent 
debtor in Georgia could prefer one creditor over another by a bona 
fide transfer of property, under provisions of Code section 3230, a8 
was held in Fletcher case, supra and earlier cases cited therein, was 
relied upon by practioners in bankruptcy matters, when the debtor 
desired to favor a local bank or other creditor to whom he would 
assign his exemption usually while in contemplation of filing or 
shortly after he filed his bankruptcy petition or an involuntary peti- 
tion was filed against him. 
The effect of the holding that notes containing a clause of as- 
signment of the exemption given by a person when he was not con- 
templating bankruptcy, would operate as  a valid assignment of ex- 
emption should the maker by thereafter adjudged a bankrupt, giving 
to the oldest dated note containing such an assignment clause prior- 
ity of payment because senior in point of date, according to the 
equitable maxim qui prior in tempore potior est jure, was to give 
to the holder of such an assignment clause a preference that the 
debtor would not have given had he "contemplated bankruptcy" 
when he signed the note. 
Two efforts to give preferences to creditors by the creation of a 
mortgage lien in one case and by a deed of conveyance in the other, 
were held to be fruitless since both transfers were junior in date to 
the notes containing assignment clauses held by contesting credi- 
tors. (3)  
If the debtor desires to prefer a creditor under Code section 
3230, probably he might be able to do so notwithstanding the fact 
1 Felker vs. Crane 70 Ga. 484. Strickland vs. Fletcher 152 Ga. 445. 
I 2 Saul vs. Bowers, 1,55 GIL. 450, Comer Bank vs. Meador-Cauthorn Co. 160 
,Ga. 717. 
3 Comer Bank Case. supra and Bank of ponialdsonville case, 169 Ga. 846. 
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that he may have given notes containing an assignment clause, if the 
principle ruled in Coker vs. Utter, 152 Ga. 158 and McBride vs. Gibbs, 
148 Ga. 380, should be applied to a transfer given in contemplation 
of bankruptcy but recorded a s  a mortgage lien securing a waiver 
note prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
In the Coker case i t  was held that judgments and other liens 
given by an insolvent within four months of the filing of a bankruptw 
petition were not avoided thereby if the lien was on exemption prop- 
erty since the trustee did not take title to it. 
In  the McBride case, i t  was held that liens on property existing 
prior to bankruptcy followed the property into the court of bank- 
ruptcy and would attach to such part of the proceeds as  were set 
apart therein as  a bankrupt's exemption. 
Seemingly i t  would follow that if a debtor owned a small farm. 
having a market value of sixteen hundred dollars, and desired to 
favor a local bank or other creditor by a transfer of his exemptioll 
after his adjudication as a bankrupt, that he might prior to the filing 
of his bankruptcy petition, give to such a creditor a mortgage to se- . 
cure a waiver note, creating a lien on the property, which the creditor 
would have recorded in county clerk's office prior to the filing of 
the bankrupt's petition. 
After his adjudication, the bankrupt would list in his schedule 
the farm, as  his exemption, and under the McBride case, supra, the 
lien would follow the property into the court of bankruptcy and 
would not be divested by the adjudication. 
The holder of the notes containing as assignment of the exemp- 
tion could only subject the right and title that the bankrupt would 
have in the property a t  the date of the filing of the petition in bank- 
ruptcy, which on that date was subject to the mortgage lien. Appar- 1 
ently the contest would not be one of priority of date of the contesting I 
instruments but priority of vested rights. 
The mortgage creditors lien vested in him before bankruptcy 
while the holder of the assignment of exemption, held a contingent 
right that only became a vested right when the maker of the note war3 
adjudged a bankrupt and as such claimed the property as his exemp- I 
tion, but in so claiming it, did he not do so subject to existing valid 
liens against i t  and wo~lld i t  not be set apart to him cum onere and if 
so, the recorded mortgage lien would have a valid preference. The 
trustee would not be affected by the mortgage lien under ruling in 
Coker case, supra, as i t  affects only exemption property. 
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Marshall and Taney: A Parallel I I 
(BY A W. COZART OF THE COLUMBIJS, GEORGIA, BAR) 
The correct official title of the judge who presides over the Su- 
preme Court of the United States is Chief Justice of the United States 
and not Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The most famous Chief Justices of that Court were John Mar- 
shall and Roger Brooke Taney. 
They were both blessed by distinguished ancestry for genera- 
tions back. Both of them were well educated. Marshall received 
instruction under private tutors and some lectures in natural philoso- 
phy a t  William and Mary, and a short course of law lectures under 
Chancellor Wythe a t  the same College. Taney was graduated from 
Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, and studied law in the office of 
Judge J. T. Chase. 
Both loved the law and politics, and they were successful a t  the 
bar and in politics from the first. Marshall had one hundred and 
fourteen cases before the Appellate Court of Virginia and won fifty 
of them. Taney had a large and varied practice in the State and 
Federal courts and he was the best equipped lawyer who ever became 
Chief Justice of the United States. Marshall was a member of Vir- 
ginia's General Assembly and Taney was a member of Maryland's 
Legislature and was the Attorney-General of his State. 
Both were members of Presidents Cabinets and the Presidents 
were grateful and wise in making the appointments. 
John Adams appointed Marshall Secretary of State in his Cabinet 
and Andrew Jackson appointed Taney Attorney-General, then Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, then Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
and then Chief Justice. His appointments to the Secretaryship of 
the Treasury and Associate-Justiceship were not confirmed by the 
Senate. 
Clay and Webster opposed these appointments in the Senate but 
they soon recognized their error in so fa r  as  the opposition related to 
the Chief Justiceship and Clay graciously apologized to Taney. 
When Marshall was Secretary of State, he was accused of being 
the "tool" of Adams because he had signed the commissions of the 
"mid-night" judges. When Taney was. Secretary of the Treasury he 
was charged with being the "pliant instrument" of Jackson because 
he signed the order preventing further deposits from being made ir. 
the National Bank. 
They were both happily married. Marshall lived with his wife 
for more than fifty years and Taney lived with his wife for more 
than forty-seven years. 
Marshall was neither religious nor irreligious. He was non-re- 
ligious. He was a member of the Episcopal Church. Taney was a 
devout Roman Catholic. 
Marshall was convivial. Taney was abstn,niious. 
Marshall's style was clear and his reasoning was cogent, but he 
was redundant and prolix. In four of his very greatest opinions ho 
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cited not a single authority. Taney's style was as lucid as  i t  was 
precige and a s  convincing as  i t  was perspicuous. 
Marshall died in his eightieth year after having been Chief Jus- 
tice for  thirty-four years. Taney died in his eighty-eighth year 
af ter  having been Chief Justice for twenty-eight years and after har- 
ing administered the oath of office to seven Presidents of the United 
States. 
FAMOUS OPINIONS. 
(a )  The greatest condemnation visited upon Marshall as  well 
as  upon Taney was the result of certain obiter dieta contained in two 
of their most famous opinions. 
In the opinion by Marshall in the case of Marbury v. Madison. 
1 Chanch 137 (1803), he went out of the record entirely to hold that  
An Act of Congress r e p u g a n t  to the Constitution is void. Other 
State Supreme Courts had previously held that !aws passed by legis- 
latures in violation of the constitution of their States were void, but 
Marshall did not cite any of these cases. I t  might have been more 
prudent, if not wiser, for Marshall to have decided the case simply 
upon the jurisdictional question, and, in that  event, he would not 
have incurred the displeasure and censure of Jefferson and Jeffer- 
son's Party. 
Taney's great blunder was in not disposing of the Dred Scott 
case upon the jtirisdictional question and in not refraining from set- 
t ing out in  his opinion certain obiter dicta on the slavery question, 
which obiter dicta brought about unexpected and most horrible poli- 
tical consequences. The decision did much to cause the War between 
the States. Taney's judgment was not as sound touching this matter 
a s  his motives were pure. 
(b) Marshall's opinion in the Dartmouth College case ig  hfs 
most famous opinion. This case has been called, "An Amendment to 
the Constitution," but i t  has been limited for the better by the 
"poli~e-power" cases and i t  has been modified and limited for the best 
by Taney's very great and his f i rs t  ovinion on a constitutional ques- 
tion in the Charles River B r i d ~ e  case, 11 Peters 420 (1837), tliough 
Taney, in his opinion, did not even mention the Dartmouth College 
case. Daniel Webster lost his f i rs t  case before th3t Court involving 
a constitution question, when he lost the Charles River Bridge case. 
Taney ruled in this case that  public  rants should ho construed strict- 
ly and that nothing passed by im~lication. 
In  this connection i t  should be observed that the Dartmouth Col- 
lege case has been cited more times than anv other case that has 
ever been decided by any American court. In the book entitled 
"Webster Centennial a t  Dartmouth Collepe," paxe 285, i t  i s  said that  
this case has been cited in the American Reports 970 times. This 
book was published several years ago and this case has been cited 
since tha t  time many times more. 
(c) In 1842. Marshall, in what, I consider, his greatest opinion, 
in the case of Gibbons v Onden, 9 Wheaton 1, held that  Congress has 
the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the judgment of the 
New York Court of Errors  mas reversed. The opinion in the case 
when decided by the New York court was written by Kent and Kent's 
- 
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opinion upheld the law of the State of New York which conflicted 
with the United States Constitution. The decision by the Supreme 
Court of the United States put interstate commerce on a sound basis 
and liberated the 200 navigable rivers of the United States. 
Taney, in 1851, in the case of "The Genesee Chief," in a masterly 
opinion, held that the United States Courts had exclusive admiralty 
jurisdiction over all inland navigable waters. The opinion in thia 
case compares favorably with the opinion of Marshall in the case of 
Gibbons v Ogden. I t  construed the admiralty clause of the Constitu- 
tion. Marshall's opinion construed the interstate clause. 
(d) In McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheaton 423, Tvlarshall, ren- 
dering the opinion, held that Congress had the implied power to create 
the Bank of the United States and that Maryland had no power to tax 
the Bank, as "the power to tax implied the power to destroy." This 
was the first case to construe the "implied-powers" clause of the Fed- 
eral Constitution. The arguments made in the case before the Su- 
preme Court were, perhaps, the greatest ever made in any court. 
Webster, Wirt and Pinkney argued for the Government and Martin, 
Hopkins and Jones for Maryland. 
(e) In Cohens v Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821), Marshall 
wrote the opinion in which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
over a State was established and a revisory appellate power of that 
Court over the judgments of State courts was established, that is, in 
cases where a Federal question is involved. This decision had great 
nationalizing influence and consequences. 
In the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1858), Taney 
wrote the opinion which was so clear and logical and his conclusions 
so preeminently just and righteous that even his bitterest enemiev 
have most heartily concurred in the opinion. He, himplelf, most 
modestly said that the opinion was "satisfactory." 
An effort was made by the United State2 Government to enforce 
the Fugitive Slave Law and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin pro- 
nounced the Act of Congress void, and resisted the administration and 
enforcement of the law by the Federal authorities. Taney's opinion 
reversed the judrzmcnt of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
In a letter which the writer received from Hon. Charles Warren 
of Washinrtton, D. C., dated Dec. 9, 1925, he said: "My private opin- 
ion is thnt Taney's opinion in the Booth case was greater than that 
in The Canesee Chief case, and that i t  did quite as much to preserve 
the Union as anything which appeared in Marshall's opinions." 
Warren is the highest authority on the history of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. He won the $2000.00 Pulitzer Prize for 
the best work in history a few years ago with his, "The Supreme 
Court is United States History.'' 
The decision in Ableman v Booth had as great a nationalizing 
effect as  the opinion in Cohens v Virginia. 
(f) In the case of Worcester v Georgia, 6 Peters 315, (1832), 
Marshall rendered an opinion in which he decided against Georgia, 
and President Andrew Jackson is reported to have said, "Marshall 
has made the decision, now let him execute it." 
Taney rendered a decision in the Merryman ease, 1 Campbell 
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246, (1861). In this case the question involved was whether Presi- 
dent Lincoln had illegally suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Taney 
held that he had illegally suspended the writ  and he sent Lincoln a 
copy of the opinion, but Lincoln utterly ignored the decision and re- 
fused to inforce the judgment. 
In these two cases both Presidents were wrong and both Chief 
Justices were right. 
THEIR WORK ON THE BENCH COMPARED 
While Marshall was presiding over the Supreme Court, 1106 
cases were decided and he wrote the opinions in 519 of them. In  62 
of those cases constitutional questions were involved and he wrote 
the opinions in 36 of them. 
During Taney's incumbency the Court rendered a f a r  greater 
number of decisions, but i t  was Taney's courteous policy to permit 
the Associate Justices to share the honor with him in the preparation 
and delivery of the opinions of the Court in important cases. 
Marshall believed in a liberal construction of the Constitution 
and he was very loose, careless, and informal when i t  came to ques- 
tions of practice and procedure in the Supreme Court. 
Taney was a strict constructionist and he insisted upon the court 
being conducted in an orderly manner and he did more to  establish 
rules of practice and procedure than any other judge who has been 
a member of that Court. 
PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
In  personal appearance both were ugly to hideouity. Marshall 
did not have but one good f e a t u r e h i s  brilliant black eyes. Taney 
did not have but one good feature-his well-shaped forehead. 
I shall conclude this parallel by quoting two remarkable pen-pic- 
tures and two exquisite tributes paid by them to their wives: 
"IIarshall, when appointed chief justice, was 46 years old, and William Wirt 
thus describes him: 
"The chief justice of United States is in his person tall, meagre, emaciated; 
his muscles are  so relaxed as not only to disqualify him apparently for any 
vigorous exertion of the body, but to destroy everything like harmony in his 
whole appearance and demeanor, dress, attitude, gesture; sitting, standing or 
walking. he is as far  removed from idolized graces of Lord Chesterfield a s  any 
other gentleman on earth. His head and face are small in proportion to his 
height; his complexion swarthy; the muscles i f  his face being relaxed, make 
him appear to be fifty years of age-nor can he be much younger. His coun- 
tenance has  a faithful expression of good humor and hilarity, while his black 
eyes, that unerring index, possesses a n  irradiating spirit, which proclaims the 
imperial powers of the mind that sits enthroned within."' 
"John H. B. Lathrobe described Taney, when Taney was attorney general 
in 1913, thus: 
"When Mr. Taney rose to speak, you saw a tall, square-shouldered man, 
flat breasted in a degree to be remarked upon, with a stoop that  made his 
shoulders even more prominent, a face without one good feature, a mouth un- 
usually large, in which were discolored and irregular teeth, the gums of which 
were visible when he smiled, dressed always in black. his clothes sitting ill 
upon him, his hand spare with projecting veins-in a ward, a gaunt, ungainly 
man." 
Tributes to Wives 
On December 25, 1832, Marshall wrote: 
"On the 3rd of January, 1873, I was united by the holiest ;bonds to the 
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woman I adored. From the moment of our union to that of our separation, I 
never ceased to thank Heaven for this, its best gift. Not a moment passed 
i n  which I did not consider her as ablessing from which the chief happiness of 
my life was derived. This never-dying sentiment, originating in love, was cher- 
ished #by long and close observation of as amiable and estimable qualities a s  
ever adorned the female bosom." 
Taney wrote his wife, on January 7, 1862: 
"I cannot, my dearest wife, suppose the 7th day of January to pass with- 
out renewing to you the pledges of love which I made to you on the 7th of 
January, fortyaix years ago, and, although I a m  sensi'ble that in that long 
per:od I have done many things which I ought not to have done, and have left 
undone many things which I ought t o  have done, yet in constant affection to 
you I have never wavered, never being insensible how much I owe you, and 
now pledge t o  you again a love as true and sincere as tha.t I offered on the 7th 
of January, 1806." 
Note: Taney married Miss Key, a Protestant, the slster of Francis Scott 
Key, the author of the "Star Spangled Banner." She died of yellow fever in 
1855 a t  Old Point Comfort. Taney died October 12, 1864. 
)Marshall married Miss Amber, of Williamsburg. She died December 25, 
1831. 
- 
versit y r the Up~i 
- .  
- 
Published three times per yea? iq,
-- .. --. --  - 
Subscriptior\ Rates $2.00 a year. Single Copies 75c. 
- 
President ..................................... M. E. Kilpatrick 
Business Manager ---------------------------------- L. N. Smith 
Notes Editor ---------------------,---------,_ W. H. 'Young, Jr. 
Recent Decisions Editor ........................... J. M. Barnes 
Book Review Editor -------------------------------- R. N. Block 
STAFF 
D. Dunwoody W. W. Larsen, Jr. 
J. L. Green R. W. Smith 
I. K. Hay M. C. Thomas 
Notes 
"Money reserved as interest a t  highest lawful rate a t  time of 
making loan is usury." 
It is a common custom among some financing institutions to 
loan money and a t  the time of making the loan to take out the inter- 
est. This has been held by our courts to be usury. For instance 
where a person borrows $100.00 and stipulates in the contract pay- 
ment of interest a t  8 per cent for a period of three months, and the 
bank reserves a t  the time of making the loan $2.00 interest and de- 
livers to the borrower $98.00. The object of interest is compensation 
for the use of money. The borrower does not receive all of the prin- 
cipal stated in his obligation, because of the reservation of enough to 
pay the interest. The real principal of his obligation is the amount 
which he actually receives, namely $98.00. When he pays the princi- 
pal as  stated in his obligation, from which the maximum rate of in- 
terest was deducted in advance he pays a sum in excess of that which 
he received and interest on it. 
The legal rate of interest in this State is 7% per annum but the 
parties may stipulate in writing for a higher rate, not to exceed 8% 
per annum. Our Statute defines usury as  'reserving and taking or 
contracting to reserve and take either directly or by indirection tc 
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greater stim for the use of mafief than the lawful interest (I ) .  The 
Code further declares-'It shall not be Iawful for any person, com- 
pany, or corporation to reserve, charge or take for any loan or  advance 
of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of mon- 
ey, any rate of interest greater than 8% per annum, either directly 
or indirectly by way of commissions for advances, discount, exchange, 
or by any contract or contrivance or device whatever! (2) All laws 
respecting the rate of interest charged for the loan of money by indi- 
viduals are applicable to banks. (3) 
It apparently was held to be the rule in cases of short time loana 
not to be usurious where interest was taken out in advance, by a 
number of authorities. Namely: McKenzie v. FIannery, 90 Ga. 691 
(5) ; Union Savings Bahk v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606; McCall v. 
Herring, 116 Ga. 236. But the Supreme Court held in Patton v. 
Bank of LaFayette, 124 Ga. 695 that these decisions were obiter 
dictum, and later in the case of Lbgansville Banking Co. v. Forrester, 
143 Ga. 303 the rule was laid do? that  i t  was usury. If we follow 
the words of the statute there can be no legitimate differentation of 
short term from long term loans. And in the latter cane i t  had 
never been doubted that i t  was usury to reserve in advance interest 
for loans in the excess of the highest legal rate for a period extend- 
ing over a year. 
The outside authorities are almost dnanimous however, that in 
short term loans it is not usurious to reserve the interest in advance. 
This rule of decision is  followed by the United States courts in the 
case of Evans v. National Bank of Savannah, 250 U. S. 111. 
Proximate Cause---Intervention of Criminal 
Cause 
Can plaintiff recover damagee for injury resulting from negli- 
gence of dependent, when an independent criminal act intervenes be- 
tween such neglf@n~e and the damage to the plaintiff? 
In order to mover,  the negligence complained of must have 
been the Proximate Cause of the injury. 1 
"Proximate cause Is that which in a natural and cbitinuous sequence un- 
broken by any new cause ~roduces an event and without which the ewnt  
would not have oaaurred,"a 
1 Code Georgia, 3427 
2 Code Georg:a. 3436 
3 Clvil Code Georgla Ib10, 2'386 
lPcrry v. Central icaitwajr. 66 &a. 178 
32 S. E. 77 
ZWestern, etc. Ry. Co. Vs. Bailey, 105 G8. 1bO 
31  S. E. 647 
. . 
.Macon vs. Dykes. 103 Ga. 847 
3 1  S. E. 449 
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". . . . . . . . . .The injury .must be the natural and probable consequence of 
the negligence, such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of 
the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong doer as  likely 
to flow from the act."B 
However, if a criminal cause intervenes between the negligence 
and the damage, such negligence is held not to be the proximate 
cause of the damage. 
The evidence showed that Andrews & Company rented a store- 
house from Kinsel who also owned the adjoining storehouse. In 
making repairs Kinsel's servants partly removed partition between 
the warehouses in making repairs, and when quitting work a t  night 
negligently left open windows in rear of empty warehouse. Where- 
upon a burglar entered these windows passed into plaintiff's ware- 
house through the partition and removed a quantity of the plaintiff'a 
goods. Andrews then sued Kinsel for $500.00 damages and the latter 
demurred. This demurrer was overruled but the Supreme Court 
held on appeal: 
"In a suit for damages, where it appears on the fact of the plaintiff's 
petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the dependent 
and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a 
third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the 
petition should be dismissed on general demurrer."4 
Where the Court said: 
". . . . . . . . . .if it appears that there intervened between the alleged negli- 
gence o i  the dependent and the damage sustained by the plaintiff the independ- 
ent criminal act of a th'rd person which was the direct and proximate cause 
of the damage, the plaintiff cannot recover."6 
In this case the plaintiff's husband, a fireman, was killed when 
a switch, negligently left unlocked by the railroad, was turned by a 
trespasser on the right of way. Under the above rule she was not 
allowed to recover. 
This doctrine has also been followed in other cases, towit: 
Where the plaintiff was assaulted and knocked against an elevator door 
which the company had negligently allowed to become insecure so that he 
fell into the shaft and was hurt, he could not recover.0 
Where the lessee of a Stae Convict negligently allowed him to escape so 
that he committed rape, the injured party could not recover from the lessee. 
Where a barkeeper unlawfully sold liquor to a person who thereafter quar- 
reled with and killed plaintiff's husband, she could not recover from barkeeper.7 
3Southern Ry. Co. vs. Webb. 116 a. 156 
42 S. E. 395 
4Andrews & Company vs. Kinsel. 114 Ga. 390 
40 S. E. 300 
4Bowers Admx. vs. Southern Ry. Co. 10 Oa. App. 367 . 
73 S. E. 677 
5Harper v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills 21 Ga. App. 322 
49 S. E. 286 
OHenderson vs. Dade Coal Co. et a1 100 Ga. 568 
28 S. E. 251 
TBelding v. Johnson 86 Ga. 177 
12 S. E. 304 
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Taxation of Shares of Stock 
Judge Cooly in his work on taxation says; "A tax on the shares 
of stockholders in a corporation is  a different thing from a tax on 
the corporation itself, or its stock, and may be laid irrespective of any 
taxation of the corporation when no contract relation forbid." The 
shares owned by the stockholders are  the individual property of the 
stockholders, and are  liabilities of the corporation and not assets. 
The fundamental object sought to be accomplished under the 
provisions of our law in relation to taxation is equality, and that  the 
rich man, the poor man, the ccrporation, the association shall alike 
contribute to the support of the Government on the basis of the value 
of the property owned, and that all taxation imposed in this State, 
shall be on this equatible plan; and any method of taxation which is  
not uniform and ad valorem is illegal and contrary to the plain man- 
dates of the law. 
The act of 1885 declared that  personal property for  the purpose 
of taxation shall be construed tg include "all stocks and securities, 
whether in corporations within the State, or in other States, owned 
by the citizens of this State, unless exempt by the laws of the United 
States o r  of this State." This act in so f a r  a s  i t  relates to the taxa- 
tion of foreign stock is still in force. Their situs for  taxation ia 
within limits subject to legislative declaration. "The Legislature 
may have the right, under our Constitution to declare that  the situa 
for  taxation of shares of foreign stock held by a resident of Georgia 
is  not in Georgia, but they clearly have the power to declare that  
shares of such stock have a situs for  taxation in t.his State." The 
General Assembly has so declared,, and residents of this State who 
own this class of property must bear the same burden a s  is  required 
of owners of other kind of property. 2 
Shares of stock are  property in the hands of the shareholder, 
still they have no inherent value, and derive their sole value from the 
tangible or other property owned by the corporation. The taxation 
of both the property of a corporation in the hands of a corporation, 
and the value of the shares in the hands of the shareholders, i s  an  
instance where the same property is  taxed twice. It is  double taxa- 
tion in a sense, but not that species of double taxation which would 
be void, i t  is permissible, but not compulsary. 
The classification of the stocks of a corporation by the laws of 
this State, whereby the shares of corporations of this State are  ex- 
empt and the shares of corporations of other States are  liable for  
taxation, when owned in this State, is  not an  unlawful classification, 
nor is  i t  in violation of the Constitution of this State, neither is  such 
classification in violation of the 14th amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. 3 The location of the assets of the corporation is  not 
a material fact in determining the liability of the shares of such 
corporation for  taxation. 
1 Athens Citv PJntermorlrs Co. v. Athens, 74 Georgia 413. 
2 Georgia Rs~il Road Co. v. TVriyht, 125 Georgia 589. 
a Coca Cola Co et a1 v. City of A t l s n t ~ .  152 Georgia 658. 
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Automobile Law in Criminal Aspect; Issue as to 
Negligence of Driver and of Injured Person 
Deaths and serious injuries from being run over by automobiles 
are of most frequent occurence, the newspapers being constantly filled 
with these tragic results of human negligence and diregard for the 
rights of others. 
A speeding or recklessly driven automobile strikes a pedestrian 
in the street. Immediately two questions arise: 1. I s  the driver 
responsible criminally? and 2. In a civil action by the injured, 
more often by his representative, what measure of care must be 
shown by pedestrian or driver in order to prevail, when there is an  
issue as to the relative negligence of each? 
& to the first  question, the case of Dennard v State gives a very 
good idea of the driver's responsibility criminally. 1 This was a 
case where, on a trial for assault with intent to murder, committed 
by running an automobile against and over a person, though the 
evidence showed no ill will on the part of accused, i t  showed that 
he was an expert operator of an automobile, and that there was no 
evidence that the machine became unmanageable or skidded, and no 
explanation of his conduct was apparent, unless he was actuated by 
a reckless disregard for human life, the driver was convicted on the 
charge, the Court holding that "the presumption of malice may arise 
from a reckless disregard for human 'life, without regard for the 
instrumentalities employed to effect a personal injury to another." 
In another case the driver of a car was convicted of assault and 
battery. He was subtiect to frequent attacks of vertigo which ren- 
dered him unable to steer an automobile a t  such times. In upholding 
the conviction in the lower court the Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant's act in undertaking to drive in such a manner, knowing 
that he was subject to attacks which rendered him unable to control 
a car, was such a disregard of probable consequences as amounted to 
criminal negligence as to one who was injured by the defendant's in- 
ability to steer his machine. 2 
As to the question of the relative negligence of the driver and 
of the party killed or injured, in a civil action for damages, the case 
of O'dowd v Newnham affords considerable light. 3 In brief, i t  
brings out the following points: 
1. That a pedestrian's right on the public highway or street is 
equal to that of an operator of an automobile, and 2. That both are 
bound to use reasonable care and to anticipate the presence on the 
streets of others. Of course, what will amount to this degree of 
care is a matter for the jury to determine. In this case i t  was held 
that i t  is not by reasonable care on the part of the pedestrian required 
that he run to escape injury by an automobile, nor is he requiireid to 
be constantly listening and looking to ascertain if cars are approach- 
114 Ga. kpp. 501 (81 S. E. 378) 
217 Ga. App. 663 
313 Ga. App. 220 (80 S. E. 36) 
Code Ga. 1910 Para. 4426 
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ing. On the other hand, however, reasonable care on the part  of the 
operator of an automobile when driving on crowded streets was de- 
fined by the Court as  "exceeding carefulness," as  thoughtless inat- 
tention is the essence of negligence. 
It has been held erroneous, hourever, to charge that "the degree 
of diligence which must be exercised in a particular exigency is  such 
as  is necessary to prevent injuring other,s," this being a greater de- 
gree of care than is imposed by law. 4 
Certain duties, such as  to sounding horns when passing vehicles 
and as  to speed and etc., are  imposed by law on drivers of machines, 
and failure to observe these requirements raises the presumption of 
negligence. 6 
4Giles v. Voiles, 144 Ga. 8.53 
Wade Ca. 8 2 5  (a) thru 828 (n). 
Torts--Parties Plaintiff In. Action for Death 
By Wrongful Act 
At Common Law in a civil court the death of a human being 
could not be complained of as  an  injury. 1 In 1846 Lord Campbell's 
Act was passed changing the law of England in this respect and in 
1850 Georgia made i t  possible for  the widow or if no widow then the 
child o r  children of one unlawfully killed, to recover damages. 
In 1887 an Act was passed providing that "the husband may re- 
cover for  the homicide of his wife and if she leave children (or child) 
surviving, said husband shall sue jointly and not separately----The 
same Act 2 provides that  "a mother or if no mother a father may re- 
cover for  the homicide of a child, minor or sui juris, upon whom she 
or  he is dependent or who contributes to his or her support." All 
of these provisions are now included in Section 4424 of the Civil Code 
1910. The Supreme Court holds that the "or" in the last sentence 
quoted above should be "and." " parent who establishes partial 
dependence upon child's labor accompanied by substantial contribu- 
tion therefrom to his maintenance, may recover. A father is not 
dependent whose earnings are sufficient to support himself though in- 
sufficient to support himself and others dependent upon him. s If 
the earnings of a mother and child living together are  necessary for  
the support of both, she is dependent. 6 Where a parent entitled to 
bring an action to tort  for  the homicide of a son dies without having 
instituted suit the right of action does not survive to the administra- 
tor of such parent. 7 The mother of an  illegitimate child has no 
right of action for  his homicide. One standing in loco parentis may 
IBa!ter 1,. Bolton 1. Carnpbell R. 493. 
2Acts of 1887 p 43. 
3Clay v. Central R.  R. Co. 84 Ga. 345 (1) 
4Central of Ga. Rlwy. Co. v. Henson 121 Ga. 463. 
5Ga. R. R. Co. v. Spinlts 111 Ga. 571 
fiAtlantic Coast Line R~vy.  Co. v. McDonald 1:s Ga. 635 
7Frazier v .  Ga. R. R. Co. 101 Ga 77 
SRobinson v. t7eorg:a R R. Co. 117 Ga. 168 
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recover for the unlawful homicide of a minor but this right depends 
on the common law not on the statute. 
The right to sue for the homicide of the husband vests in thz 
widow a t  the death of her husband and is not divested by the subse- 
quent marriage of the widow; 10 and a widow may recover although 
she was separated from her husband a t  the time of the homicide. l1 
The wordjng of the Code leaves room for considerable doubt as  
to  whether a child may sue for the homicide of its mother. The Su- 
preme Court has held however that the child will have such a cause 
of action provided the father is dead. 12 
The General Assembly has recently made two important addi- 
tions to Section 4424. The Courts had held that an adult child 
could not maintain an action for the homicide of its parent; '3 and 
further that children adults a t  the time of the homicide were not 
entitled to share in the proceeds of a judgment obtained by the 
widow. 14 An Act 16 of 1924 amends Section 4424 so that "a child 
or children, minor or  sui juris," may recover. A quite recent case 10 
holds that under this amendment dependency is not essential to re- 
covery by a child whether minor or sui juris. The same Act of the 
General Assembly adds the following to the section under discussion: 
"In cases where there is no person entitled to sue under the foregoing 
provisions of this section the administrator of the deceased person 
may sue for and recover for the benefit of the next of kin if depend- 
ent upon the deceased or to whose support the deceased contributed. 
9City of Albany v. Lindsay 11 Ga. App. 573: Atkinson v. Yarborough 13 
Ga. 781. 
loGeorgia R. R. and Banking Co. v. Garr 67 GR. 277 
1lCentral Rwy. Co. v. Bond 111 Ga. 14 
12Atlanta etc. R. R. Co. v. Venable 65 Ga. 55 
13Mott v. Central R. R. Co. 70 Ga. 680 
14Coleman v. Hyer 113 Ga. 420 
15Lnws 1924 p 60 
16Peeler v. Central of Ga. Rwy. Co. 137 S. E. 24 
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Recent Decisions 
Convegmncea-Reservation in Deed as to DZinemIs. 
Grant vs. Haymes. Supreme Court of Georgia, June 22, 1927. 138 South 
Eastern Reporter page 892. 
Where the owner of a described tract of land made a Contract of w e ,  
and executed to the buyer his bond for t.tle, in which he made this provision: 
"There is a sand bank on the property to #be conveyed, and the right is re- 
served to remove all of the said sand in said bank, and to remove timber grow- 
ing over said sand bank, so as to better enable him t o  get the sand." He later 
died, the executrix and sole legatee oi the grantor, pursuant to his bond, con- 
veyed said land to the grantee, with the same reservat.on of said sand as tha t  
contained in the bond for title, 
Deeds-Mines and Jdmerals Owner may convey fee and lesser right to 
sand in cbank on land. "reservation" reserves to grantor some new thing issu- 
ing out of thing granted, not in being, i t  differs from a n  "exception," which 
in part  of thing granted: common law d i ~ t ~ n c t i o n  between "exception" and 
"reservation" are  immaterial where Intention is controlling consideration. 
Reservation in grantor of sand on land conveyed held not revoked by 
grantors death reservation in grantor of sand on land conveyed reserved fee 
in sand, though containing no words of inheritance, reservation in grantor of 
sand on land conveyed if treated as "exception" reserved, fee in sand passing 
to grantors heirs or devisees. Civil Code 1910 section 3659. 
We do not think that this reservation is a mere personal privilege or li- 
cense. A license as a term of real estate law, 1s a n  authority to do a particu- 
lar act  or series of acts unop another's land without passessing any estate 
therein. Augusta L Savannah R. X. Co. vs Augusta Southern 1C. R. Co. 96 
Georgia page 562. 
I t  is compelent for one to convey the fee in land to another and  reserve 
the right to sand in a sand bank thereon. See Holmes vs Martin, 10 Georgia 
page 503, 506. 
While we hold that under this reservation or  exception the title to this 
sand remained in the grantor under his bond for title passing to his heirs if 
he died intestate, or to his devises if he died testate we do not mean that the 
grantor his heirs, or devisees had a n  unlimited time in which to remove this 
sand in the sand bank, the language in which this reservation is couched clear- 
ly indicates that the grantor was to remove all of the sand bank. I n  these 
circumstances we think the sand should be removed within a reasonable time, 
and that upon the failure Of the grantor or those claiming under him to re- 
move i t  within a reasonable time, the right or title to the sand would be divest- 
ed. See Morgan vs. Perkins. 94 Georgia page 353. 555. 2 1  South Eastern re- 
porter 574, ,575 a s ~ m i ~ a r  ci cumstance. 
Where s clced collreys the timber on land and makes no mention of the 
time within which to remove it, the vendee has a reasonable time within which 
to remove the timber. .VAcRae vs Stillwell 111 Georgia, page 65, 36 South East- 
ern reporter 604. 
Stanil~ng tinrber L not personalty but realty, and that a sale of growing 
.trees is a sale of an interest In land. Coody vs Gress Lumsber Co. 82 Georgia, 
page 793. 10 South Eastern .reporter, page 218. 
Supreme Court held, that i t  is competent .for the owner of land to convey 
the fee thereto to another and reserve the right to the sand in sand bank 
thereon. Such reservation did not terminate a t  death of grantor, being a fee 
in the sand. If the sand was not removed in a reasonable time by grantor, his 
heirs of devisees, or those claiming under him, the right or title to the sand 
rwould be divested. Judgment reversed. 
Common Carriers, Action for Damages. 
Central of Georgia Railway Co. vs. Council Brothera. Court of Appeals of 
Georgia, March Term 1927. 
This was an action to recover Damages, occasioned ,by a Common Carrier 
where i t  failed to divert a shipment ,beyond its own lines, although no notice 
of the requested diversion was given to the initial carrier. 
Where by the terms of its bill of lading the initial ca r r~er  agreed to trans- 
port a car of peachas from a point in this State to a point in another State, 
the transportation to be made over its own lines and those of connecting car- 
riers, the sh.pper if the owner, ha9 the right es  a n  incident to the contract of 
carriage, before the shipment reached the point of destination named in the 
;bill of lading to direct the terminal connecting carrier to divert the shipment 
to another place upon its lines; and if such terminal carrier failed to divert the 
shipment aa directed by the shipper, in consequence of which the peaches were 
damaged, the initial carrier would be liable to the shipper for such damages, 
although no notice of the requested diversion was given to the initial carrier. 
Under the Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce act, a s  amended 
by the Cummins Act, any common carrier subject to the provisions of said 
act,  receiving goods for transportation from a point in this state to a point in 
another state, is required to issue a receipt or bill of lading therefore, and is 
liable to the lawful holder thereof for any damage to such property caused by 
it  or $by any common carrier to whlch such property may be delivered or over 
whose line, or lines it may pass within the U. S. when transported on a through 
bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulations or other limitation of 
any character whatsoever shall exempt such initial carrier from such liability. 
A rule of the initial carrier, which stipulated that it would not be liable for a 
Iailure to divert any shipment, where the shipment has passed beyond its own 
1;nes of railway, unless s.uch failure was caused by the negligence of its own 
smployees, was void and illegal under the said Carmack amendment, not- 
withstanding its approval #by the Interstate Commerce Commission." Central 
rf Georgia Railway Co. vs. Council Brothers 163 Georgia page 494, 136 South 
Eastern reporter page 48, decided by the Supreme Court in answer to a certi- 
!led question by this court. 
A common carrier is bound to use extraordinary diligence in transporting 
goods accepted by it. In  case of loss or damage of such goods, the presump- 
?ion of law is against the carrier, and no excuse will avail it unless the loss or 
damage was caused by the Act of God or the pub1.c enemies of the State. Civ- 
11 Code (910). section 2712. The Act of God means any  act  produced by physi- 
cal causes which are  inevitable in other words, unavoidable accidents are the 
same a s  the Acts of God. Fish vs. Chapman 2 Georgia page 349. 
I n  the'instant case the plaintiff proved damage to the shipments, and the 
defendant carrier failed to show that  the damage was occasioned by the Act 
of God or by the pujblic enemies of the State. 
Judgment Affirmed. 
I Landlord and Tenant, Sublease. 
Garbutt & Donovan vs. Barksdale Pruitt  Junk Co Court of Appeals of Geor- 
gia, Division No. 2. September 12, 1927. 
A lease was made for five years, the tenant made a sublease without the 
permission of the landlord to the defendant partnership, and it  never appeared 
that the landlord had ever recognized the defendant partnershib as his tenant. 
A lease of real estate for a term less than five years passes no estate out 
of the landlord, the tenant has only a usufruct, and he can neither sublet the 
premises, convey his usufructuary interest, nor assign his lease without the 
landlord's consent. Sealy vs. Kuttner, 41 Georgia, page 594: Hooper vs. Dwin- 
nell, 48 Georgia, page 442, 445; 'Hudson vs. Stewart, 110 Georgia, page 37, 35 
South Eastern, page 178; De Foor vs. Stephens, 133 Georgia, page 617, 619, 66 
South Eastern page 786. 
If with the consent of the landlord, the tenant subrents the rented prem- 
ises, the subtenant becomes the tenant of the orginal tenant, who is entitled 
to  proceed against him for rent under the agreement made between thos par- 
ties (Boyd vs. Kinzy, 127 Georgia, page 358, 56 South 'Eastern 420); but the 
status of the original tenant with the owner remains the same, and the original 
contract between them remains unimpaired. I n  such a case the subtenant does 
not become the tenant of the owner, and the owner cannot proceed against 
him for rent, although in the w e  of agricultural lands he would have a spec- 
la1 lien on the crops raised by the subtenant. Hudson vs. Stewart, supra; Mc- 
Connell vs. East Point Land Co. 100 Georgia, page 129, 134, 28 South Eastern 
page 80. 
RECENT DECISIONS 
If without the consent of the landlord, the tenant should undertake to eub- 
let the premises, .the landlord, not being bound thereby, may ignore such un- 
authorized agreement without in  any wise affecting his rights under his con- 
tract with the original tenant, or he may refuse to recognize the right of pos- 
session in the subtenant and proceed to expel him from the rented premises 
as a mere intruder; or he may, a t  his option, affirmatively elect to treat such 
unauthorized subtenant occupying his premises as his own tenant instead of , 
the original tenant, in which case the relationship of landlord and  tenant be- 
tween the owner and the original tenant ceases. .Such a n  election on the part 
of the landlord owner whereby the new unauthorized subtenant in substituted 
as tenant for the original tenant may .be effected tby a n  expressed recognition 
'by .the owner of the subtenant a s  his tenant, or it may be implied from such 
affirmative acts and conduct as will clearly indicate a n  intention on the part 
of the landlord to  effect such a substitution. Nere acquiescence in the sub- 
,tenant's possession of the rented premises under his agreement with the orig- 
inal tenant does not constitute such an election; nor will the mere acceptance 
of payments by the subtenant in accordance with the terms of the original 
contract made with the original tenant be held to constitute a n  abandonment 
of the contract with the original tenant and the substitution of a new agree- 
ment with the subtenant. Cuesta vs. Goldsmith, 1 Georgia Appeal page 48 
(I), 57 Southeastern 983; Americus Manufacturing etc., Co. vs. Hightower, 3 
Georgia Appeals 65, 59 South Eastern 309; Hooks vs. Bailey 5 Georgia Appeals 
211, 62 South -stern 309; Hooks vs. Bailey 5 Georgia Appeals 211, 62 South 
Eastern 1054; Mendel vs. Barrett, 32 Georgia Appeal, tr81 (I), 124 South Eastern 
107. In order for the acceptance of such ,payments as  made by a n  unauthorized 
subtenant to have the effect of establishing such a new agreement, it must 
clearly appear that it was the intention of the landlord to accept the payments 
a s  made by the subtenant on his own behalf a s  the owner's tenant, instead of 
th.rough him for and on #behalf of the original tenant. 
I t  not appearing in the instant case rnat the landlord had ever recognized 
the defendant partnership a s  his tenant, and it not appearing that the pay- 
ments for rent by partnership checks a s  made by the member of the partner- 
shi,p .with whom the original written contract of tenancy was made were re- 
ceived and accepted as payments made by the partnership a s  tenant, the court 
did not e r r  in granting a nonsuit. 
Judgment Affirmed. 
Party WaIk-Pmscription-Injunction Against Cutting Windows. 
Levinson v. Goode. Supreme Court of Georgia June 20, 1927. 138 South- 
eastern Reporter 583. 
This is a case where injunction was sought to prevent the defendant from 
cutting windows in the  east wall of his store building, on the ground that said 
wall was a "party wall", and no leave had been granted by the plaintiff for 
the windows to be cut. The wall divided the store of the plaintiff from that of 
,the defendant, both connecting therewith. The defendant sought to cut the 
said windows .n the enst wall of the second story of his store building, in order 
to convert said story into offices, said windows to loolc out over the roof of 
plaintiff's stcre, which was one-story. The petition zr.rleged the stores and brick 
wall between had been in existence more than 20 years, and the wall had been 
considered as a party wall by them plahtiff and defendant and their respect- 
ive predecessors in title during the entire period, and tha t  cutting said win- 
dows would weaken the wall to the damage of the plaintiff. The defendant 
answered, denying that plaintiff had any right or title in said wall, alleging 
tha t  defendant owned the same in fee simple, and praying the court to enjoin 
the plaintiff from interfering with defendant in installing the windows. 
The theory of party wall is based on the principle that adjoining land- 
owners owe to each other lateral support of the soil in Its natural state. Civil 
Code 1910, sec 3619. The parties did not derive title to the respective lots un- 
der a common grantor. The claim of Goode is restricted to the rights ac- 
quired under 20 years' possession, open, adverse, notorious, under a claim of 
right. What was that occupancy? Under the urldisputed evidence, it was 
limited to the support Of the connecting walls and the other portions of the 
store. "A division wall between two buildings, having for the period of lim- 
itations lbeen used for the support of both buildings, becomes in effect a party 
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wall, whether or not originally constructed a s  such, and without any express 
agreement by the owners of the buildings." Weadock v. Champe. 160 N. W. 
564. This pr-nciple applies generally where the entire wall has been jointly 
possessed by borh parties for the recluired length of time. One could not ac- 
quire prescriptive title to  a n  easement in a wall several hundred feet high or 
long, by joining or attaching to such wall a structure 20 or 30 feet high or 
long. These figures are  used for illustration only. The qualified rule has been 
well stated in Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, a s  follows: "1. The extent of a n  
easement to use a wall of a n  adjoining owner for the support of a building. 
which is acquired by prescription, is the enjoyment of the use of the wall for 
the support of the house a s  it existed dur.ng the period of prescription. 2. 
The owner of a wall which is subject to a n  easement #by prescription for the 
support of the building of a n  adjoining owner has the right, on raising the wall 
higher, to the sole use there& unaffected by any easement for the use of the 
new portion to support a new story of the house to which the easement be- 
longs. 
The facts in the Barry case, just cited, were quite similar to the facts of 
this case. and it ruled on the precise question here raised. Following the line 
of reasoning in, that case, we find that, under the facts, these conclusions are  
required. The wall stands on the land of Levinson. The use of the wall by 
Goode and his predecessors was of no benefit to the owners of the wall, and 
hence i t  was a mere burden upon the property, open, adverse, and acquiesced 
in. The law implies the grant to do the things that have been done for so 
long a time that a lawful right has  *been acquired. I t  cannot be presumed 
that either party intended that  the wall should be a party wall except for the 
purpose of supporting the other wall to the extent that it had been supported. 
That  was, therefore, the extent of the prescriptive right; namely, to enjoy 
the use of the wall for the support of the prescribers' house a s  it then existed. 
The owner of the wall can do with it a s  he chooses, provided he does nothing 
of detriment to the other's right. I t  follows, necessarily, that Goode had no 
right in or to that  part of the wall which is above the height of his own store, 
hnd which is not required for the support of the timbers of his house, and in 
placing window openings in the second story portion of the wall, there was 
no invasion of the rights of Goode )by Levinson. For these reasons the ver- 
dict was unsupported by the evidence, and the court erred in refusing to grant 
a new trial. 
Judgment-Cause For  Setbing Aside. Flanigan v. Hutchins et  al. Su- 
preme Court of Georgia. June 1 7 ,  1927. 138  Southeastern 793. 
Hutchins filed suit against J. C. Flanigan on a promissory note; said case 
being for trial on Dec. 5, 1923. Two days prior to said date Flanigan executed 
to his wife a deed conveying property to which he had legal title. Judgment 
on the note w m  obtained a t  the, March, 1924 term of the court by Hutchins. A 
fi. fa. issuing on said judgment was levied on said property, and Mrs. Flanigan 
filed a claim which she later withdrew. The land was advertised for sale; 
whereupon Mrs. Flanigan filed a petition malting Hutchins and ~VcGee, sher- 
iff, defendants, seeking to enjoin the sale. The petition alleged that the land 
was orig:nally bought by the husband with the funds of the wife: that a t  all 
times she was the equitable owner thereof; that, upon ascertaining that the 
husband had taken title in the deeds, she insisted that he execute the title 
to  her, which he did; that  Hutchins, after obtaining judgment against the hus- 
band, instituted a n  equibble suit for the cancellation of the deed from the 
husband to her; tha t  plaintiff employed a n  attorney, and instructed him to 
file a defense to the suit of Hutchins for cancellation, upon grounds stated, 
but that the answer prepared by counsel was sent to her in a distant part of 
the state for verification; that, after said verification, she placed the papers in 
the U. S. mail, addressed to the attorney at Winder, Ga.; that the same were 
lost, and for this reason were never filed in the court; that, when the suit filed 
by Hutchins for cancellation came to be heard, there being no answer thereto 
of file, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, cancelling the deeds, with- 
out the introduction of any  evidence, and that  such verdict and judgment were 
due to "accident in law"; and in her present petition she prays that the last 
named judgment and verdict be set aside, to the end that the case for cancella- 
tion may be tried, and the issue thereof submitted to a jury for determination, 
and that the court enjoin the sale. The exception is to that judgment. Held: 1. 
The facts alleged and shown do not constitute equitable cause for setting aside. 
the  judgment. The court was authorized to find that the defendant could 
have filed a n  answer and obtained a hearing by the exercise of ordinary dili- 
gence. Where one has not exercised ordinary diligence, equity will not in- 
tervene to set aside the judgment. (a) 
2. "In all cases, except actions for unliquidated damages and suits on 
unconditional contracts in writing, in the several courts of this state, where 
the writ of process has been served, as  the law directs, on the defendant, and 
there is no defense made by the party sued, either in person or  ,by attorney, a t  
the time the case is submitted for trial, the case shall 'be considered in default, 
and the plaintiff shall be permitted to take a-verdict a s  if each and every 
item and paragraph were proven by testimony." (b) 
3. Apply the foregoing principles, the judgment refusing a n  injunction 
waa not erroroneous. 
............................................................................... 
(a) Mullins v. Christopher, 36 Ga. 584; Berry v. Burghard, 111 Ga. 117; 
Latimer v. Irish-American Bank, 119 Ga. 887. 
(b) Civil Code 1910, sec. 5662; Brown v. Hammond, 160 Ga. 446; Glenn- 
ville, etc., Co. v. Jordan, 144 Ga. 14. 
Insurance-Overdue Premiums. Life Insurance Co. v. Bartlett. Court of 
Appeals of Georgia. June 14, 1927. 138 5. E. 689. 
Suit was brought against the Life Insurance Co. of Virginia u,pon two pol- 
icies of life insurance issued to the wife of the plaintiff. Under the ruling of 
p a t e  v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 19 Ga. App. 597, and the facts of ,the 
instant case, the petition was not subject to general demurrer because it  show- 
ed that no beneficiary was named in the policies declared upon, and that  the 
plaintiff was neither the executor nor the administrator of ,his deceased wife's 
estate. The request of counsel for the plaintiff in error that the decision in 
the Pate case, supra, .be reviewed and overruled is denied. 
"Where the insurer, by his custom ancl course of dealing with the insur- 
ed, i n  receming, without objection, premiums or  assessments past due, when 
she could have insisted upoi a forfeiture has induced the belief on the part of 
the insured premiunis or assessments can ,be paid within a reasonable time af- 
t e r  they mature, the insurer cannot claim a forfeiture because, a t  the time of 
t h e  death of the insured, premiums or assessments were due by him which, 
had he lived, it is reasonable to suppose it  would have ,been accepted upon the 
same t e r m  a s  those upon which other deferred payments had been re- 
ceived." (a) 
.............................................................................. 
(a) Bankers' Health and Life Insurance Co., 35 Ga. App. 666. 
Cotton States Life Insurance Co. v. Lester, 62 Ga. 247. 
Under this ruling and the facts of the instant case, the insurer cannot 
claim forfeiture of the policies because of the failure of the insured to pay one 
of the premiums within the times specified in the policies. This is true al- 
though each of the po1ic;es contained the following stipulations: "It (the pol- 
icy) shall be void if many premium shall not be paid according to the terms 
thereof: and it is agreed that this provision, which avoids the policy in case 
any  premium shall be overdue, shall not ,be considered in any respect waived 
by any ac t  of grace #by the company in the accept of overdue premiums upon 
this or any other policy." 
According to the terms of the policies, they became void upon the failure 
of the insured to pay any premium within four weeks from the  date on which 
i t  was due. However, the petition showed that payments of many premiums 
on the policies more than four weeks in arrears, had (been accepted by the 
insurer in full satisfaction of such premiums, and that the only payment not 
so accepted was made a t  the office of the district manager of the defendant 
company in Macon, Ga., on June 21, 1926, for the premium .due on May 17, 
1926, and that  this payment was made one or  two days bfeore the death of the 
insured. The petition is silent as to the state of health of the insured on 
June 21, 1926. 
Under the above-stated rulings, the court .did not err  in overruling the 
demurrer to the amended petition. 
Judgment a w m e d .  . 
50 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
Municipal Corporations-Ordinancea fixing wagea for public work. 
A municipal corporation, though not required by the charter to let con- 
tracts for a public work to the lowest bidders, and though clothed as to such 
matters with the fbroadest discretionary powers, has no authority to adopt a n  
ordinance prescribing a fixed scale of wages that shall be paid for all public 
work of the city. Such an ordinance of the city of Atlanta is ultra vires and 
illegal, because it tends to encourage monopoly and defeat competition, and 
also tends to put a heavier burden upon the taxpayers .than they would have 
to .bear of free competition were allowed; and all contracts made in pursuance 
thereof are  void. Wilson vs. City of Atlanta. No. 5762 Supreme Court of 
Georgia. 139 Southeastern Reporter 148. 
The ordinance in question above was enacted by the mayor and council of 
the City of Atlanta on August 16, 1926. The preamble of the ordinance pro- 
viding for a standard or fixing of proces to be paid a s  wag& for skilled labor- 
ers in the employ of the  city or parties making contracts with the city, where 
such contracts provide for work or the erection of public buildings and bridges 
or repair thereof: and also providing that eight hours will constitute a day's 
work for wid laborers deecribed as skilled laborers." 
Applying the princigle stated above, the ordinance seeking to fix the scale 
of wages of skilled laborers and also to fcx the number of hours constituting a 
day's work and made by the mayor and council of the city of Atlanta was held 
ultra vires and illegal. 
The controlling facts in the above cited case are  very similar to those in 
the case of City of Atlanta vs. Stein. 111 Ga. 789. 
In  the case of City of Atlanta vs. Stein i t  was held that a municipal cor- 
poration has no authority to adopt a n  ordinance prescribing that all work of a 
designated nature shall be given exclusively to persons of a specLfied class. 
In  this Instance, the City of Atlanta, by means of a n  ordhance had sought to 
place all contracts for the printing required by the city, in the hands of union 
laborers. The ordinance eliminated all companies using non-union laborers 
from taking part in the bidding for such printing contracts. 
The similarity is immedlately seen, and like in the first case cited, the 
reason for such ordinances being held ultra vires and illegal was because they 
tended to encourage monopoly and defeat competition. 
Motor Vehicles-Contributory Negligence-Fact F o r  Jury. 
Where the driver of a motor truck, traveling on a street in the city of At- 
lanta, attempted to turn to his right into a n  intersecting street without ex- 
tending his a rm a t  an angle above the horizontal as a signal of his intention 
to turn, he was guilty of a violation of a n  ordinance of the city; and where the 
driver of a n  automobile, traveling behind the truck and in the same direction, 
attempted to pass the truck on the right, in vivlation of another ordinance of 
the city, just as the truck began to turn t o  its right into the intersecting steet. 
and the driver of he following automobile was thereby forced to drive upon 
the adjacent sidewalk, and his automobile struck and injured a person upon 
the s:dewalk, in a suit brought by the injured person for damages against 
both drivers it was not error for the court to overrule the general demurrer 
interposed by the drive of the truck to the petition, since it was a question of 
Tact for the jury whether the negligence of the driver of the truck contributed 
concurrently and directly with the negligence of the driver of the truck con- 
trilbuted concurrently and directly with the negligence of the driver of the au- 
tomobile in causing the injuries sued for. No. 18151 Court of Appeals of 
Georgia. 139 Southeastern Reporter 156. 
I n  further support of thls declsion we cite the caae of the Georgia Railway 
and Power Company vs. Ryan. 24 Ga. App. 288. The determination of ques- 
tions as t o  negligence lies peculiarly within the province of the jury, and in 
the exercise of this function the question as to what constitutes the proximate 
cause of a n  injury complained of may be directly involved a s  one of the es- 
sential elements and disputed issues in the ascertainment of what negligence, 
a s  well as whose negligence, the injury is proper@ attributable to. 
RECENT DECISIONS 
Homicide-Specitlic Intent As Essential Element. 
A well settled rule was brought out recently in the case of Springer vs. 
the State, and Battle vs. Same. No. 18243 Court of Appeals of Georgia. 139 
Southeastern Reporter 159. 
I t  was held in this case that a n  essential ingredient of offense of assault 
with intent to murder is specific intent to kill. 
In  prosecut;on for assault with intent to murder, where there was no evi- 
dence, direct or circumstantial, tending to show specific intent to kill, and no 
evidence authorizing finding that defendants intelltionally committed assault 
charged, conviction unauthorized. 
The court held; Under repeated rulings of the Supreme Court and this 
court, a n  essential ingredient of the offense of assault with intent to murder 
is the specific intent to kill. dn neither of the instant cases was there any 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing or tending to show such a n  intent 
on the part of the accused. Furthermore there was no evidence authorizing 
even a finding that either of the defendants intentionally committed the as- 
sault with which they were charged. 
I t  follows that  the verdict in each case for assault with intent to murder 
was  unauthorized, and that the court erred in each case in refusing the grant 
of a new trial. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
Handbook of Roman Law 
BY MAX RADIN, LLB. PH. D. 
Prof .  of Law, University of California 
Mr. Radin on his exellant treaty on Roman Law primarily ar- 
ranged the book for the study by lawyers and law students, but i t  is 
written in such a way that even those that have studied neither L a v  
nor Latin can understand his treatment of this comprehensive sub- 
j ect-matter. 
The book itself is an elementary glance over the great system 
which has successfully disputed the domination of the modern world 
with the law of England. Mr. Radin stresses the fact that if one 
wishes to make any degree of headway, they must first  acquire the 
language of the men who shaped the Roman Law and enlarge i t  to 
fulfill its superb destiny, 
Only several instances are presented, of the many that might 
illustrate the points involved. Perhaps the reasons for selecting 
these instances was an attempt to avoid those situations of Roman 
social organization which have no real counter-part a t  the present 
day, the situations, that is, created by the domestic relations of 
patria potestas, of guardianship and of slavery. Inevitably only 
a distorted picture can be gained, if we push into the background, 
what was in the foreground of Roman consciousness; but there may 
perhaps be some advantage in maving for the post part among rela- 
tions familiar to us. 
Mr. Radltin takes for granted that his readers are familiar with 
Anglo-American Law, and has illustrated Roman concepts by refer- 
ences to the common law more frequently than is generally done in 
most books, or than would be advisable if a general audience were 
chiefly in view. However, he has made an  effort to use only parallels 
which are self explanatory, and does not insist upon them unduly. 
The modern method of citation is  used in quoting Corpus Juris, 
which discards Roman numerals altogether, and gives the book, title, 
fragment, and section in that order. 
American Law has a connection with Roman Law more intimate 
and direct than that derived from our English inheritance. At the 
time when the political severance took place, American lawyers and 
publicists were not disinclined to look for a broader basis for their 
Institutions than the historical fact of their recent membership in 
a policy they had rejected. Upon subjects relating to personal con.. 
tracts and private rights, the Roman law seemed of outstanding 
exellence. So we may comprehend the valuable qualities and prin- 
ciples that can be garnered from the study of this broad field of 
Law. Particularly is the law field indebted to Mr. Radkin for his 
discourse and able treaty of this comprehensive subject. 
BOOK REVIEW 
American Constitutional Law 
BY HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, L. L. D. 
Author of Black's Law Dictionary, and of Treatises on Judgments, 
Bankruptcy, Recision of Contracts, Interpretation of Laws, 
Judicial Precidents, etc. West Publishing Company. 
As i t  is stated in the preface this latest revised edition of Dr. 
Black's Handbook of American Constitutional Law was made neces- 
sary by the enormous expansion of Constitutional Law in recent years. 
The book is one of the Hornbook Series and has the advantage? 
of the books of that series. The chapters are divided into numbered 
paragraphed; a t  the head of which there is a clear resume of the 
leading principles in black letter type which is followed by explana- 
tory matter. The paragraphs are quite complete and are written in 
a style that is  very easy for the student to understand. Dr. Blacl;, 
in explaining the principles of our National Constitution and of the 
various State Constitutions, has given very full notes indicating the 
authorities for his statements. 
The book falls into four general divisions although each of these 
parts has some things in i t  that applies to the other divisions. 
The first  division contains the first  four chapters. The chapters 
consider definitions, the nature of and the relations between the 
United States and the States, "The Establishment and Amendment of 
Constitutions," and the fourth chapter deals with the constructi0n.s 
2nd interpretation of Constitutions. 
The Second division gives a description of the plan of the Fed- 
eral Government. Following this plan of the government there are 
three chapters, one devoted to each of the three great departments 
of the government. Then there are two more chapters, one dealing 
with the "Interstate Law as Determined by the Constitution," and 
the other with "The Establishment of Republican Government." 
The third division considers the State Constitutions as  to the 
powers of the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Departments as 
granted by the State Constitutions and limited by the Federal Con- 
stitutions, and the Acts of Congress. 
The last division of the book consists of eleven misceln!neous 
chapters, and is the part that is least susceptible to classification. 
Some parts of each of these chapters refer to the Federal Constitu- 
tion and Government, while others refer to the State Constitutions. 
These chapters are on: "The Police Power," "The Power of Tnxa- 
tion", "The Right of Eminent Domain", "Municipal Corporations", 
"Civil Rights and Their Protection by the Constitutions", "Eqna! 
Protection of the Laws", "Due Process of Law", "Political and Pub- 
lic Rights", "Constitutional Guaranties in Criminal Cases", "Laws 
Imparing the Obligation of Contracts", and "Retroactive Laws". 
In this division are the two subjects of Constitutional Law that are 
the hardest for the student to grasp: "The Police Power" and what 
"Due Process of Law" means. Dr. Black gives a masterly treatment 
of both of them but especially so of "due process of law". He shows 
what "due process of law" is under various circumstances, and ren- 
ders the idea of i t  very plain to the student. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 
Cases of Trial Practice 
Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri 
West Publishing Company, 1927 
The Author, Dean McBaine, realized that most of our more im- 
portant devices, employed to conduct a trial, are of English origin. 
So, this book, which is one of the American Case Book Series, is a 
compilation of English as well as American cases and decisions. The 
cases have been limited to major steps that are most frequently taken 
in the trial of a cause, and to steps that are common to nearly all 
American jurisdictions. 
The book includes 368 cases on almost every possible phase of 
trial practice. I t  begins with cases on the jurisdiction and venue, 
terminating with those on rendition, entry and sufficiency of judg- 
ments. The cases are introduced in a most logical order-first, 
dealing with the Jurisdiction in which suit is brought; next Pro- 
cess, Default Judgments, Judgments without trial of Facts, Change 
of Venue, Continuance, The Jury, Sufficiency of Evidence, Opening 
Statements, Instructions by the Judge to the Jury, Argument of 
Counsel, The Verdict, Trial by Court-without Jury, New Triala, 
Exceptions, and the Renditions, Entry and Sufficiency of Judgments. 
In the order that a point might present itself-in that order the case 
on that point was included. Citations of cases were made to show 
various applications of the rule found in the cases printed. 
The student of the subject, as  well as  the practioner will find 
this book of considerable practical value. 
The selection of cases is, on the whole, commendable. The au- 
thor has gone through the entire field of his subject, citing modern, 
as  well as older leading cases, and always making the points, sought 
to be brought out, clear. All in all, Dean McBaine has given us an 
admirable compilation. 
BOOK REVIEW 55 
t Cober's Georgia Evidence 
This work will be published in January, 1928. I t  is written by 
Geo. F. Gober who wrote The Georgia Form Book and Procedure. I t  
is an endeavor to present the subject of evidence from the Code and 
the decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The vol- 
ume will contain about one thousand pages. A distinguished jurist 
who has examined the manuscript said i t  would be the best and most 
helpful book to the Lawyer that had been printed in the State. Many 
orders have been received for it. There will be only a limited edition. 
